

Philolgoi

The Belmont University
Undergraduate
Journal of Philosophy

Volume Two
Fall 2013

PHILOLOGOI:

THE BELMONT UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Φιλολόγος

Philologos (mas. noun): “student, scholar.”

From the conjunction of *philos* [a friend]
and *logos* [word, idea, reason];

philologoi are “fond of words, *i.e.*, talkative, argumentative,
learned, philological.”

—*Strong's Greek Concordance.*

It was said of Socrates, that he was a *philologus*—one fond of words, talkative, keen of speaking (*Phaedrus* 236e). According to Aristotle, it is one who is fond of dialectic or of philosophical argument, a lover of learning and literature, or one who is literary (*Rhetoric* 1398b14). For Zeno, the *philologoi* are lovers of reason; they are students and scholars, learned in conversation, and studious of words (*Stoic. I.67*).

—*Liddell Lexicon.*

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Mission Statement:

Philologoi: The Belmont University Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy is a student-run scholarly journal deeply rooted in the history of philosophy. Our mission is to provide an engaging and reflective forum for showcasing exceptional undergraduate work, particularly that which explores the idea of philosophy as a way of life.

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
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Philologoi warmly congratulates Luke Craig, the winner of our inaugural Cover Art Contest, for sharing his remarkable work with us. We wish to thank the Department of Philosophy at Belmont University, as well as the College of Arts and Sciences, for their enthusiastic support, and are equally grateful for the assistance and fine services of the Pollock Printing Company of Nashville, Tennessee. Finally, we would like to extend our sincere appreciation to all of the many fine authors who submitted papers and for the committed attention of those whose works appear herein.



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
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Editors' Letter

Is philosophy a way of life? If so, what does it look like? How does one lead this sort of life? Is the philosophical life achieved by merely reading works of philosophy? Is there more to it? Does one live this life intentionally or fortuitously?

These are the sorts of questions that fuel our weekly philosophical discussion group called "Philolatoi," which roughly means "lovers of rational conversation" in Classical Greek. Every Friday we ask pertinent philosophical questions that drive us to become more introspective and, simultaneously, more dialogical, creating an intense community of individuals collectively seeking wisdom. With this as an inspiration, we conceived *Philolatoi: The Belmont University Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy* in the fall of 2011. From its creation, it has been our hope that, through the publication of exceptional undergraduate work, our readers would have a similar experience as the members in our discussion group—one that challenges philosophical perspectives, one that inspires new ideas, and one that makes you a member of a greater philosophical community and discussion.

This volume of *Philolatoi* brings with it an exciting new addition. We are delighted to announce the founding of an annual art contest for the cover of the journal. Consistent with the spirit of our vision, we understand that philosophy as a way of life manifests itself in a variety of ways, one of which includes art. We feel that an art contest will further our (and hopefully your) exploration of philosophy as a way of life in a new medium. The cover now creates a visual experience that invites the spectator to explore creatively the multiple interpretations to which philosophy and art lend themselves.

As the cover invites new questions and multiple interpretations, so does the work published inside. Faithful to our philosophical commitments, we have created a flexible forum that is open to diverse voices. Similar to our Friday morning discussions, we feel that any idea, and any style of engaging that idea, is worthy of investigation. In this volume you will find analytic, Continental, modern, and political approaches to making phi-

losophy a personal enterprise, as well as an academic one. As you read these pieces, let yourself become captivated by the ideas, engage them with passion and a critical eye, and most importantly, carry them with you on your personal voyage. We plead with you to make philosophy something vivid and active in your daily life, and we hope that this volume will help you in that endeavor.


Philosophy is not something that we just do. It is something that we *live*. If you, too, have been bitten by the philosophy gadfly, in whatever form, then you know very well that it is a hard one to escape. It is one that both keeps you up all night, frustrates you with poor arguments, draws you to debate, aggravates you with endless questions, but also excites you with curiosity, delights you with new insights, and instills inside you a love for words, thoughts, and ideas. We treat it like the thrill it can be.

Philologoi would be nowhere without its wonderful staff members—their dedication and passion has been the driving spirit for its formation and continuation. It is a remarkably fulfilling moment when, amidst a journal meeting, arguing over papers, feeling like the discussion is going everywhere and nowhere, all the sudden it happens: we realize that this moment, the nitty gritty process of constructing a philosophical journal, is, in itself, a manifestation of our journal's vision. We realize that this moment is somehow a part of what it means to lead a philosophical life, and we realize that in this moment we truly are "*philogoi*," lovers of rational discussion. Thank you to each and every staff member who makes that sort of moment possible. Before we leave you all to the fine papers inside, we have one more important thank you to our managing editor, Dr. Mélanie Walton; her support allowed for not only the creation of an undergraduate journal of philosophy at Belmont University, but also for its sustained success, and for which, we are extraordinarily grateful.

On behalf of the entire staff, we invite you to read, discuss, argue, analyze, and explore with us. We invite you to contemplate the philosophical life. And finally, we invite you to take on the name that we ourselves have assumed: *philologoi*.

Sincerely,
Mackenzie Foster and Bronson Rains
Editors

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LOVRO SAVIĆ

**John Locke and Modern
Theories of Mental Disorder**

ABSTRACT: According to certain interpreters of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke has provided a concept of madness similar to modern psychiatric conception of delusion. In this paper, I propose to extend this view. More precisely, I will try to show that Locke's clarification of madness anticipates two modern philosophical accounts of mental disorder in general: Boorse's and Wakefield's account of mental disorder. This will hopefully show and enhance both importance and relevance of Locke's philosophical work to the growing field of intersection between philosophy and psychiatry.

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Introduction¹

Anthony Quinton once famously reflected on “a remarkable fact that philosophers, in a sense the experts on rationality, should have taken so little interest in irrationality.”² Moreover, he made no less interesting a claim that “madness is a subject that ought to interest philosophers; but they have had surprisingly little to say about it.”³ However, these implied acts of negligence cannot be attributed to John Locke, who, in his famous masterpiece *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*—more than three hundred years ago—“offered an elementary discussion of various mental maladies,” including madness, lunacy, and other kinds of irrationality.⁴ Indeed, with the emergence of philosophy of psychiatry and philosophical psychopathology, Locke’s work on madness was occasionally considered by some interpreters—as indicated by the claims of the American psychiatrist James Phillips and psychologist James Morley that Locke’s theoretical conception of madness offers traces identifiable in certain psychiatric conceptions of mental disorders—namely delusion—suggested, primarily, by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.⁵ However, despite this occasional and infrequent interest based mainly on the phenomena of delusion, this part of Locke’s work has been mostly overlooked by other scholars and widely excluded from philosophical considerations. In this paper, I propose to fill this significant gap, to enrich philosophical reflection on Locke’s work, and work to develop an adequate interpretation of his account of mental disorder. I will try to show that his proposed definition of madness appears to have offered a conceptual basis for the understanding of mental disorder in general, and that it shows certain similarities to what some modern theories of philosophical psychopathology propose nowadays. After assessing his basic ideas, I will try to argue that, when reconsidered, it is

¹ I would like to thank my colleague Viktor Ivanković, for his helpful and constructive comments and generous aid through several stages of this paper, and Lada Obradović, for her great assistance during its initial phases.

² K. W. M. Fulford, Tim Thornton, and George Graham, *Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4.

³ *Ibid.*, 614.

⁴ Graham George and Lynn Stephens, “Preface,” in *Philosophical Psychopathology*, eds. George Graham and Lynn Stephens (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003), vii.

⁵ James Phillips and James Morley, “Introduction,” in *Imagination and Its Pathologies*, eds. James Phillips and James Morley (London, England: The MIT Press, 2003), 3.

plausible to consider Locke to have anticipated contemporary accounts of mental disorder. This, in turn, will hopefully be sufficient for an illustration of Locke's work as a relevant "philosophical resource of psychopathology."⁶

Locke on Delusion

At the very beginning of Book II in his *Essay*, John Locke introduces the concepts of the "idiot" and "madman." Locke emphasizes that idiots and madmen are primarily characterized as deficient in terms of mental faculties of reasoning. This portrayal of the mentally impaired led American psychiatrist James Phillips and psychologist James Morley to conclude that Locke's definition of madness "prevailed through the ensuing centuries" and "did much to shape an understanding" of the conception of delusion in today's psychiatric practice.⁷ They justify their rather radical idea with reference to the fourth edition of *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder* (DSM-IV).⁸ According to DSM-IV, delusion is defined as a "false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary."⁹ Phillips and Morley discern consistency and derivation of this definition from Locke's explanation of the madman's condition as taking "their fancies for realities ... by the violence of their imaginations."¹⁰ They go even further and suggest that Locke's definition "was a direct influence" on the conception of delusion in the modern era and thus marks "a continuity from Locke to DSM-IV."¹¹ I will not go into detail and examine

⁶ George Graham and Lynn Stephens, "An Introduction to Philosophical Psychopathology: Its Nature, Scope, and Emergence," in *Philosophical Psychopathology*, *Op. Cit.*, 1.

⁷ Phillips and Morley, "Introduction," *Op. Cit.*, 2, 1, respectively.

⁸ The *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder* (also known as "The Shrink's Bible") offers a classification system of mental disorders published by American Psychiatric Association (APA). The first edition was published in 1952. Today, psychiatrists around the world form their diagnoses by reference to the fourth edition of DSM (DSM-IV), which was published in 1994. DSM-V is expected to be published in 2013.

⁹ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 4th edition (Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Association Press, 1994), 765.

¹⁰ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 36th edition (London: William Tegg, 1869), Bk. II, Ch. XI, §XIII.

¹¹ Phillips and Morley, "Introduction," *Op. Cit.*, 2, 3, respectively.

reasons for their acceptance of the claim about Locke's *direct* influence on the psychiatric conception of delusions, for this would lead us astray to a historical examination of Locke's work.¹² However, for the purpose of this paper, the rest of the Phillips and Morley's claim serves as a suitable starting point for a conclusion that Locke's notion extends far beyond a mere similarity with theories of delusion. Thus, in what follows, I will argue that Locke's theory of madness anticipates two modern philosophical theories of mental disorder in general.

Locke's Idiots and Madmen

Locke's *Essay* can be understood as an attempt to make a detailed presentation of philosophy of the mind, its scope, powers, and limits. Locke establishes his analysis and his understanding of the mind within an empiricist view, which begins from a position that humans are born with minds lacking *any* innate concepts and ideas. This view is best illustrated by Locke's well-known notion of *tabula rasa*, according to which our initially blank mind is gradually supplied with ideas through life as enabled through our sensory experience. However, contrary to the rejection of innateness of any ideas, Locke affirms that our knowledge of the world is not only mediated by our sensory experience but also by our innate mental capacities of mind and reasoning. He distinguishes several of these capacities or faculties of mind, including: perception, retention, discerning, comparing, composition, enlarging, and the abstraction of ideas—which eventually manifest in “quickness of parts,” invention, fancy, and reasoning. In the early stage of his *Essay*, Locke was aware that his detailed philosophy of mind could reveal failures of the mind, weaknesses, and a lack of any of the above-mentioned mental faculties.¹³

Thus, in his *Essay*, Locke attributes to idiots and madmen a lack of knowledge in terms of primary principles and by their mental and perceptual deficiencies. As Robert Hoeldtke, in an historical examination of British medical psychology, points out: “although Locke claimed that the

¹² For more detail on this subject, cf. Mark S. Micale and Roy Porter, *Discovering the History of Psychiatry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

¹³ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Op. Cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. XI, §XII.

proper function of reason was to associate ideas in a rational fashion, he was more impressed by the peculiar tendency of thoughts to arrange themselves in strange patterns.”¹⁴ This point is best illustrated by considering the following quotation:

In fine, the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason; whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths, and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For by the violence of their imaginations having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them.¹⁵

The idiot’s mind suffers from an incapability of discerning, whilst madmen, on the other hand, are deficient in the ability to connect ideas in the right way. More precisely, the mental faculties of madmen seem to fail to generate, or generate to a greater extent, a comparison of ideas, which equally result in a “faulty mixing of ideas by deranged and violent imagination.”¹⁶ Locke seems to acknowledge the logical aspects of madness, namely deduction from false premises, in terms of valid reasoning born from a malfunctioning imagination.¹⁷ Thusly, Locke’s basic view is that “madmen associate ideas incorrectly, whereas idiots were incapable of associating ideas.”¹⁸ Following Locke, it is safe to conclude that faculties responsible for making logical deductions (from data provided by material sense organs, and thus equipping one’s *tabula rasa* with ideas) are susceptible to impairment and disability.

¹⁴ Robert Hoeldtke, “The History of Associationism and British Medical Psychology,” *Medical History* 11, no. 01 (1967): 47.

¹⁵ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. XI, §XIII.

¹⁶ Phillips and Morley, “Introduction,” *Op. Cit.*, 2.

¹⁷ I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of *The British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy* (2012) for advice on this point.

¹⁸ Hoeldtke, “The History of Associationism and British Medical Psychology,” *Op. Cit.*, 46.

It is also justifiable to assume that Locke regards these capacities as mind's *normal* activity. Following an empiricist view about innate faculties (not ideas and principles), we can consider the following:

Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another; it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Beside this, there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom: ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be united in some men's mind that it is very hard to separate them ...¹⁹

Herein, Locke develops the claim that mental faculties of connection and discerning ideas are to be understood as natural activities, independent of the will of the human mind—they are what we cannot control voluntarily, which is to say, that they are what the mind does *normally*. It is best to regard them as “an automatic affair, taking place beyond the control of the active mind.”²⁰ Moreover, it is plausible to consider the talk about innateness of mental faculties as a disguised way of talking about their natural or normal functioning. Thus, Locke writes, that “men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impression, and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions and principles.”²¹ Bearing in mind Locke's position on innateness, impairment, and natural faculties of mind, we can look, now, into modern philosophical theories of psychopathological conditions.

Modern Theories: Boorse and Wakefield's Accounts

Although today there is an accepted definition of mental disorder established and propagated by *American Psychiatric*

¹⁹ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. XXXIII, §V.

²⁰ Hoeldtke, “The History of Associationism and British Medical Psychology,” *Op. Cit.*, 47.

²¹ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, Bk. I, Ch. II, §I.

Association, and included in their influential *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder* (DSM), there has been a burst of philosophical effort to formulate a more adequate and satisfactory account. Some philosophers and psychiatrists, mainly critics of the definition included in DSM and concept of mental illness in general, in addressing and tackling alleged issues and inadequacy of DSM, tried to incorporate metaphysical, ethical, and Aristotelian philosophical findings in their new theoretical conceptions, thereby creating an array of theories, which eventually resulted in a development of a still growing field of philosophy of psychiatry and philosophical psychopathology. Contrary to anti-psychiatrists and mental disorder skeptics (who are critical towards the mere idea of mental disorder and whose main task is to show that mental illness either does not exist, or, at best, that it is a “historically unstable category”²²), some psychiatrists, physicians and philosophers have focused on the creation of a more acceptable and precise definition of mental disorders, those that can be accordingly employed in psychiatric practice. The critics are led by the work of the American-Hungarian psychiatrist Thomas Szasz and the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. Foucault’s main idea is that “contemporary notions of mental illness are rooted in contingent, historical developments,” and, more precisely, that “our thinking of mental disorder ... could easily have been different.”²³ Szasz’s views are far more radical and supported with strong philosophical argumentation, which is apparent in his conclusion that mental disorders do not exist and that we should only regard them as mere myths.²⁴ On the other hand, there are those theorists who try to improve the existing definitions and conceptions of mental disorder. For example, psychiatrist Robert Kendell, in response to Szasz, tries to (re)define mental and physical illnesses in terms of biological disadvantage.²⁵ Philosopher Christopher Megone bases his account on an argument that the “concept of mental illness can be satisfactorily clarified if and only if, it is related it to an Aristotelian conception of human nature and human te-

²² Rachel Cooper, *Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 14.

²³ *Ibid.* Further, cf. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Random House, 1965).

²⁴ Thomas S. Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), ix.

²⁵ R. E. Kendell, “The Concept of Disease and Its Implications for Psychiatry,” *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 127, no. 4 (October 1, 1975): 305–315.

los.”²⁶ British philosopher and psychiatrist Bill Fulford tries to explain illnesses as failures of ordinary doing accompanied with pain.²⁷ Each of the above-mentioned accounts played and still play an important role in today’s debates about the existence and nature of mental disorder. Moreover, with their endeavors to define mental disorder, these theorists have both implicitly and explicitly made a great impact on the definition of physical illness. It should be noted that some of them have been intensely criticized and disputed; others are still debated today in the field of philosophy of psychiatry. Besides the above-mentioned accounts, the most prominent position in theorizing about mental disorders is occupied by biological accounts propagated by American philosophers Christopher Boorse and Jerome C. Wakefield. In what follows, I will briefly outline their basic ideas.

Even though it is not without critics, the early biological account of mental disorder, proposed by the philosopher Christopher Boorse, represents an attempt to define mental and physical disorders in terms of dysfunctional human bodies and minds. To achieve this, Boorse based his account on a novel conception of the human body as composed of a number of interrelated parts. To this end, he incorporates in his account a technical notion: “sub-system.” The liver, heart, skin, eyes, bones, and other parts of body are examples of subsystems. According to philosopher of medicine Sadegh-Zadeh, on a higher level, this definition also involves systems like the cardiovascular system, homeostatic system, immune system, digestive system, nervous system, etc. In contrast, on a lower level, we can distinguish other parts or constituents like the liver’s right lobe and coronary ligament, the heart’s left atrium, the aorta, nerve cells, etc.²⁸ However, it should be noted that a *system*, while derived from the Greek term *συστημα* or *sistema*, which means “standing together,” is not a “mere assemblage ... of any objects without any bonds or relationships between them.”²⁹ Just the opposite, a system should be regarded as “an entity composed of interrelated parts [consisting of] objects [and

²⁶ Christopher Megone, “Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values,” *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology* 7, no. 1 (2000): 45-65.

²⁷ Tim Thornton, *Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry*, 1st edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §1.3.

²⁸ Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh, *Handbook of Analytic Philosophy of Medicine*, 2012th edition (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2012), 119.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 113.

the] relationship between these objects.”³⁰ Moreover, according to Boorse, every subsystem has a natural function. As the philosopher Rachel Cooper explains it, “the function of a sub-system is whatever it does that contributes towards achieving the goal of a goal-directed system.”³¹ So, for example, the natural function of the heart is to pump blood through the body. When this function is executed properly, we are considered healthy. In contrast, Boorse’s account of disorder is to be understood as a condition in which a subsystem fails to execute its function, and thusly fails to contribute to the higher purpose of the whole organism—in this case, staying alive.³² To illustrate this further, consider the coronary artery as a heart’s sub-system, which supplies several sections of the heart with blood. If the right coronary artery *dysfunctions*, an interruption of blood supply occurs and leads to myocardial infarction, in which a higher sub-system *dysfunctions* and leads to a failure of a goal-directed system. In other words, according to Boorse, a heart attack is a pathological condition because it represents the heart’s failure to execute its function of pumping blood.

A similar account of disorder is presented by the American philosopher Jerome Wakefield. Wakefield follows Boorse’s conception of a disorder except that he claims that mental disorder must also be considered as a harmful dysfunction, wherein *harmful* denotes a value notion and refers to social norms.³³ Wakefield writes:

Suppose that one function of [the] learning mechanism is to associate the response of fear with danger. ... Sometimes a severe trauma or other unusual sequence of stimuli causes the formation of an enduringly exaggerated sense of danger that causes substantial harm to a person. Such a disposition constitutes a disorder, because not only is there a dysfunction

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Rachel Cooper, *Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005), 13.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ More precisely, the idea behind this conception is a reconciliation of the facts-values debate in philosophy of psychiatry. For more, cf. Thornton, *Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry, Op. Cit.*, part 1.

... but there is also a harm (the exaggerated fear is painful of disabling).³⁴

Similarly to Boorse, Wakefield keeps his definition within biological theory and remains committed to the notion of a failure of biological function. However, he importantly adds to his account the notion of values. Not only does a disorder represent a dysfunction of a certain mechanism in a human organism, it also involves undesirable, painful, harmful, dangerous, and ruinous aspects and consequences. In other words, mental disorders depend on a dysfunctional condition that is negatively valued by society. This part of his account makes use of medical praxiology in certain cases.³⁵ It is also important to mention that Wakefield argues that the DSM definition is based on the idea that a condition is a disorder if and only if it is a harmful dysfunction.³⁶

Here, two questions arise. First, how can we connect the above-mentioned examples to Locke's idiots and madmen? And, second, what are the reasons for the working conclusion that Locke *anticipated* modern theories?

Similarities between Locke and Modern Theories

We said that, according to Locke, idiots suffer from an incapability to discern and reason, whilst madmen, on the other hand, are primarily deficient in the ability to connect ideas in the right way. Thus, I claim that such an observation suggests a rather strong resemblance, not only between Locke's conception of madness and modern psychiatric conception of delusion, but also between Locke and modern accounts of mental disorder in general. Conceptual analysis allows certain paraphrases of Locke's ideas and definitions thusly providing satisfying interpretation of his philosophy of mind that incorporates the empiricist postulation of innate mental capacities. Let us consider one such satisfying clarification of Locke's position that brings out these resemblances. Locke, as we said, depicts the human mind as composed of a number of mental faculties whose

³⁴ J. C. Wakefield, "The Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary Between Biological Facts and Social Values," *The American Psychologist* 47, no. 3 (March 1992): 386.

³⁵ Thornton, *Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry, Op. Cit.*, 31.

³⁶ Cooper, *Classifying Madness, Op. Cit.*, 18.

functioning results in reasoning, logical deduction, imagination, understanding, the comparison of ideas, and so forth; it is a feature which induces the “nobleness” of the human mind and “sets man above other sensible beings.”³⁷ These are natural features of the human mind that enable our specific functions in everyday cooperative, independent, and passive activities. This claim can be easily paraphrased into a definition of the mind as “an arrangement of circumstances that makes things happen in a certain way.”³⁸ This paraphrase is a representative example of a list of conditions of what makes something a *system* in the above-mentioned way. Mental capacities *are* organized in a certain way. In addition, these mental capacities are interrelated in a way that results in specific manifestations: reasoning, normal mental functioning, etc.

Here, we have an easily perceived one-to-one correspondence between Locke and Boorse’s theories of mental disorder. In other words, the former’s term “mind” and the latter’s term “system” are co-referential—they refer to the same thing. Cooper captures it succinctly in her remark that “organs, such as the nervous system and mental modules (if there are any) will all count as Boorsean sub-system.”³⁹ Mind, as a system, in order to function, is composed of numerous sub-systems, which, on the other hand, function in their own right and strive towards the goal of the whole system. According to Boorse, sub-systems are susceptible to dysfunction, which leads to the failure to fulfill the goal of the goal-directed system. Locke has a similar conclusion—he writes that:

Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand ... or reason, to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly. ... And indeed any of the fore-mentioned faculties, if wanting or out of order, produce suitable defects in men’s understanding and knowledge.⁴⁰

³⁷ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, Bk. I, Ch. I, §I.

³⁸ Edward De Bono, *The Mechanism of Mind* (New York: Penguin Group, 1990),

17.

³⁹ Cooper, *Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science*, *Op. Cit.*, 30.

⁴⁰ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. XI, §XII.

We have, thus, another correlation: namely, between disability or defect of Locke's mental faculties and Boorse's goal dysfunction of the goal-directed sub-systems. Another striking similarity refers to the mind as a goal-directed system. As noted above, the mental faculties of the mentally stable enable their specific functions in everyday cooperative, independent, and passive activities. These activities can be understood as the goal of the mind as a system. Consider, for example, this representative passage:

This wrong connexion in our mind of ideas, in themselves loose and independent on of another, has such an influence, and is of so great force, to set us awry in our actions, as well as moral and natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.⁴¹

And again:

Thus you shall find a distracted man, fancying himself a king, with a right inference, require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience; others, who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies.⁴²

This is due to the dysfunction of mental capacities of reasoning, or as Locke puts it "either by any sudden very strong impression, or long fixing his fancy ... incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully as to remain united."⁴³ These quotations provide us with important concepts that ought to be extracted and then must be clarified:

- 1) The wrong connection of ideas,
- 2) Which can set us awry in our actions,
- 3) Which can set us awry in our moral actions,
- 4) And which can set us awry in our natural actions, passions, reasoning and notions themselves.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. XXXIII, §IX.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. XI, §XIII.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. XI, §XIII.

Here, again, an analogy between Locke's theory and Boorse's account is easily perceived. The key concept (1) "The wrong connection of ideas," a mental ability that we can consider as a sub-system of the mind, is Locke's connection of ideas—a sub-system that, in the case of idiots and madmen, quite clearly dysfunctions and fails to contribute to a goal-directed system. More precisely, idiots' minds are dysfunctional in the sense of their lacking of mental capacities; madmen's minds, on the other hand, are dysfunctional in the sense of the wrong connection of ideas.

Claims (2), (3), and (4) point to Locke's assumptions about potentially dangerous consequences of dysfunctional acts. The former key claim (1) clearly gives us an insight into these disabling consequences, namely, that the dysfunction of mental faculties can render us inoperative in everyday activity. In a nutshell, the mental dysfunction of the incorrect connection of ideas may often influence the moral and social conduct of a subject. The madman, according to Locke, may imagine that he is made of glass, which was presumably a common mental disorder of Locke's time. In accordance with his state, the subject exhibits inappropriate social behaviors, which may lead to a number of undesired and harmful consequences. Locke explicitly relies on a harm of madness. Thus, he regards man's healing from madness "as the greatest obligation he could have received."⁴⁴ And, here, we have a similarity between Locke and Wakefield's account of mental disorder as a *harmful dysfunction*.

However, one may ask whether or not the similarities are outweighed by the differences. Some of the differences may be based on the ways by which views of the human mind, systems, and mechanisms have evolved since Locke's day. For example, the emphasis on logical reasoning has since greatly diminished, with more emphasis turned to the non-logical aspects of thought; further, self-consciousness, linguistic culture, emotions, embodiment, and other aspects barely approached and addressed in Locke's *Essay* are today widely considered. In addition, rather than limiting the notion of madness to correct deductions from false premises, modern theorists assume a much more complex interplay of different factors, all of which can malfunction in very different ways. Such theorists may regard Locke's account as pe-

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. XXXIII, §XIV.

ripheral to any general account of mental disorder.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that any lack of knowledge as to modern philosophical and metaphysical theories simply does not result in a difference in attitude towards certain philosophical problems—an attitude that Locke, as I have shown, clearly took. And, as I have also shown, there is a clear existence of co-referential terms in both Locke's and modern accounts of mental disorder. Finally, even if it may be, concerning his clarification of madness, that Locke is on very edge of the psychiatric domain, this critique cannot be applied to a philosophy of psychiatry and philosophical psychopathology, which, eventually was an aim of this paper.

Conclusion

Although the definition of mental disorder based on harmful dysfunction is considered to be a philosophical and theoretical construct of modern philosophy of psychiatry, it seems obvious that Locke provided a rough sketch of this account. This is an interesting observation considering more than three hundred years of difference between advocates of these positions. This gives us a strong reason to conclude that Locke *anticipated* modern theories. This also shows that the claim proposed by James and Morley should not be regarded as wrong, but rather as *incomplete*. Making one step ahead, I tried to show that Locke's conception of madness *anticipates* two modern philosophical theories of mental disorder. Thus, by comparing Locke's theory with Boorse's biological account, I have suggested that psychopathological states, as explained by Locke, may be clarified as dysfunctions of an organism's sub-system. Also, I have emphasized the similarities between his account and Wakefield's theory of disorder as harmful dysfunction. I have explained this by pointing out that the dysfunction of mental capacities may have dangerous consequences for the individual and his or her immediate surroundings. Locke's *Essay*, therefore, proves to be an undoubtedly important resource for the historical and philosophical examination of some early thoughts on philosophical psychopathology. Despite the origin of philosophical psychopathology generally considered to be Karl Jaspers' influential work *General Psychopathology* (written in 1910 and published in 1913), it is ob-


⁴⁵ I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of *The British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy* (2012) for pointing out this objection.

vious that important conceptions were conceived significantly earlier—namely with John Locke, thusly making him a precursor of modern ideas of philosophy of psychiatry and philosophical psychopathology, a prominent figure of theoretical, and no less significantly, historical importance.

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KAITLYN NEWMAN

**Group Rights in the Liberal State:
The Limitations of Idealism and
the Necessity of Practicality***

ABSTRACT: “Multiculturalism” is a weighty word in American society today, especially when one takes into consideration the recent controversies surrounding the building of mosques in various U. S. cities. Issues of multiculturalism and group rights have perhaps never been more relevant to American politics than they are at present. Though group rights are typically linked with communitarian philosophy, I argue that this connection is neither desirable nor necessary, and group rights can and must exist within the framework of modern liberal society. For the purposes of this essay, I focus on the debate between Will Kymlicka and Rainer Forst, two important scholars on group rights. Kymlicka adopts a “cultural marketplace” (pluralistic) approach to the problem, and Forst responds to Kymlicka by promoting a Kantian notion of group rights. While Forst’s theory of group rights is the most internally consistent and perhaps even the most desirable, Kymlicka’s conception is the most practicable in modern liberal society.

** {Editors Note: Paper Redacted by Request of Author}*

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DARIA SLEIMAN

**On Physicalism, Qualia
And Agency**

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to examine some implications for agency of physicalism as the preponderant theory in philosophy of mind. To this end, I engage with Jaegwon Kim's stimulating book *Philosophy of Mind* and, on occasion, his other work *Physicalism, or something near enough*. I explain how a physicalist might fail to account for intrinsic phenomenal properties or qualia. Then, I explain how a physicalist might still be able to preserve qualia differences. Finally, I assess the extent to which it might be problematic for our understanding of ourselves as agents to lose qualia as intrinsic qualities to epiphenomenalism, but to save qualia differences therefrom. In contrast to Kim, I contend that losing qualia as intrinsic properties to epiphenomenalism entails a significant loss of agency insofar as it leads to the neglect of actualizing our innate capacity for creation and sharing; I seek to demonstrate this by establishing and analyzing a relationship between qualia, art, and agency.

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Introduction

Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that concerns itself with questions about the mind's nature and its properties, the realm of consciousness, and how they relate to the physical body (known as the mind-body problem).¹ Upon the emergence of new research in cognitive science in the 1950's, many began to wonder whether neural events were perhaps identical to mental events, given their apparent correlation; otherwise, if not an identity, what other kind of correlation could exist between the two, and from whence does it stem? Questions such as these are central to the study of the mind, which has undergone an interesting history. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the comprehensive framework within which most philosophers proceed is termed "physicalism," and philosophers and non-philosophers alike widely accept this framework, in part, because it is consistent with scientific practice. Physicalism is also a building block of eminent analytic philosopher and William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University Jaegwon Kim's architecture of his book *Philosophy of Mind*, with which I will be engaging throughout this paper; thus I shall assume physicalism for the purpose of this paper.²

Definitions and Contextualization

It will prove useful to define some key terms I will be employing frequently hereinafter: physicalism, qualia and intentional-cognitive states, functional reduction, epiphenomenalism, and agency.

One understanding of "physicalism" is as the theory according to which all things are either physical or supervene on the physical. One of its principles is the causal closure of the physical domain, by which it is to be understood that "the physical world is causally self-contained and self-sufficient."³ Because it is generally accepted that mental phenomena have effects in the physical world—for example,

¹ I am grateful to Professor Andrew Reisner, Roger Smith, and Agatha Slupek for their encouragement and thoughtful comments on this or earlier versions of this paper.

² Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind*, 3rd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011).

³ *Ibid.*, 112.

that my wanting a glass of water may result in my reaching out my arm to grab it, where *wanting* is a mental phenomena and *reaching out* is a physical phenomena—the following conclusion is also typically accepted: “mental phenomena are physical phenomena.”⁴ Physicalism, then, claims to be able to account for all phenomena, mental and physical alike. Later on, I will explore the limits of physicalism in this respect.

Amongst these mental phenomena, according to Kim, one may find two kinds: qualia (also referred to collectively as “phenomenal consciousness”) and intentional-cognitive states. Qualia are the “way things *seem, look, or appear* to a conscious creature.”⁵ They are those mental phenomena that involve “sensory qualities: pains, itches, tickles, having an afterimage, seeing a round green patch, smelling ammonia, feeling nauseous, and so on.”⁶ The quale of the color red, for example, is the *redness* of the red. Analogously, what makes a pain a pain is its *painness*—it hurts. There is something it is like to see the color red and there is something it is like to feel pain, and these corresponding phenomena are what we refer to as qualia. Intentional-cognitive states (also called “propositional attitudes”), conversely, are those mental states that lack a phenomenal or qualitative property. They can be “attributed to a person by the use of embedded that-clauses.”⁷ For example, a belief is a propositional attitude; in the sentence “Kendra believes that her brother will have lunch with her at noon,” the belief is the speaker’s attitude or state, and the proposition (which constitutes the content) is that her brother will have lunch with her at noon. Other states may include hoping, desiring, doubting, and so on. Emotions also fall under this same category because they too have content—for example, the view is that Kendra would not merely be *sad*, but that she would be *sad-that*, in this case, her brother could not make it to lunch.

I will demonstrate that this distinction between two types of mental states is crucial to the understanding of the relationship between physicalism, mental phenomena (in particular, qualia) and agency—or lack thereof. Kim argues, as

⁴ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 291.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁷ *Ibid.*

will be clearly explained below, that intentional-cognitive states such as beliefs and desires can be functionally reduced, whereas qualia cannot. Functional reduction is a mode of reduction that aims to provide a reductive explanation of consciousness in terms of neural states. In other words, philosophers have the task of defining physical states and mental states; some, like Kim, favour a functionalist account whereby mental states are neural states that play a particular functional role in a broader system of inputs and outputs. That is to say, everything for which physicalism claims to be able to account ought to be functionally reducible—which I claim to not be the case.

Although physicalism appears to functionally reduce mental states to physical states successfully (at least on a theoretical level—the rest of the work is left to the scientists), there exists another theory in philosophy of mind that holds that mental events are causally inefficacious: epiphenomenalism. There are two forms of epiphenomenalism: weak and strong. Weak epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events can be caused by physical events, but cannot, in turn, act as causal factors (of either mental or physical events). Strong epiphenomenalism maintains that mental events belong to an entirely different realm of things, that they exist outside of the causal world and, hence, cannot be caused by or cause anything (whether of a mental or physical nature). This view is especially worrisome with regards to agency, for it implies that if I simply were to want a glass of water, for example, this theory would be unable to account for how I would act on that want and reach out my arm to grab the glass. Nothing could be a consequence of my mental life, of my desires, my intentions, my beliefs or my thoughts.

In *Philosophy of Mind*, Jaegwon Kim explores the main theories of the past centuries in philosophy of mind and arrives at the conclusion that, amongst the contemporary theories so far developed, physicalism and epiphenomenalism are the most plausible ones (although he will ultimately reject both). Because epiphenomenalism entails such an immense loss of agency, Kim attempts to save a maximum of mental events and properties from it through functional reduction and into physicalism. Even physicalism, however, has its limits.⁸

⁸ *Ibid.*, 333.

Agency implies, among other things, the ability to recognize oneself as an agent—one who is endowed with cognition and rational thought, and has the capacity to act as a result of the exercise of the former. I have previously explained the relationship—or lack thereof—between epiphenomenalism and agency; it would seem that the relationship between physicalism and agency is a much more promising one with regards to both the capacity to account for mental events and properties and the preservation of our full agential capacities. The premise upon which this suggestion is based is that our agency and cognition lie entirely in the intentional-cognitive domain.

The purpose of this paper is to take issue with the aforementioned premise. I contend that losing qualia as intrinsic properties to epiphenomenalism entails a significant loss of agency insofar as it leads to the neglect of actualizing our innate capacity for creation and sharing; I seek to demonstrate this by establishing and analyzing a relationship between qualia, art and agency.

The following section of this paper will shadow Kim's analysis of the relationship between physicalism and phenomenal consciousness, with the subsequent section consisting of my reply to Kim in which I introduce art as a medium to understand a relationship between qualia and agency. I will begin by explaining how a physicalist might fail to account for intrinsic phenomenal properties or qualia. Then, I will explain how a physicalist might still be able to preserve phenomenal differences. Finally, I will assess the extent to which it might be problematic for our understanding of ourselves as agents to lose qualia as intrinsic qualities to epiphenomenalism but to save qualia differences therefrom.

The Relationship between Physicalism and Phenomenal Consciousness

As previously explained, Kim invites us to consider mental phenomena as consisting of two kinds: intrinsic phenomenal events or properties (qualia), on the one hand, and intentional-cognitive states, on the other.⁹ He draws this distinction in order to analyze each kind with respect to func-

⁹ *Ibid.*, 328.

tional reduction, which he considers to be the only option left if one does not wish to embrace epiphenomenalism. Kim appears to successfully offer a model for the functional reduction of intentional-cognitive states; nonetheless, he argues that states with qualia are in fact irreducible.

To this end, he takes up the “qualia inversion argument,” which supposes a world physically identical to ours, and whose only difference from our world is that its people have an inverted color spectrum. To better illustrate this theory, suppose that there is a small child barely beginning to acquire language. Suppose further that her color spectrum is inverted: what we call “red,” she sees as green, and what we call “green,” she sees as red. Her mother, who possesses a normatively regular color spectrum, in order to teach her child how to speak English, has a small book for children. On each page, there is a circle colored with a unique color and beneath it is written the name of that color. Where the circle is red, the word “red” is written beneath it, and the mother utters the word “red,” pointing out the colored circle to her child. Recall that the child’s color spectrum is inverted; she is learning that the name of the color she is shown is “red,” but what she actually sees we would call “green.” This knowledge that she thus carries throughout the rest of her life consists in always referring to green as “red,” and vice-versa.

Now, let us generalize this situation to another world, whereby everyone’s color spectrum in that world is inverted in comparison to ours. If this world is just like ours in all physical respects, there is no way of accounting for that unique difference—so goes the argument. So, whereas people from both worlds would all refer to a ripe tomato as “red,” to use another example, and use the same word to describe the color of the ripe tomato, it would not be the case that they have the same phenomenal qualitative state of consciousness—in fact, what the people in the other world of our thought experiment call “red” we would call “green” and vice-versa. Clearly then, qualia cannot be functionally reduced. To sum up Kim’s argument: a property can only be realized if it can be functionalized; qualia are not functional properties; it follows that qualia cannot be realized. “So qualia are not functionalizable, and hence physically ir-

reducible.”¹⁰ This is how a physicalist might fail to account for intrinsic phenomenal properties or qualia.

However, a physicalist might still be able to preserve phenomenal differences, or differences amongst qualia. Kim argues that qualia differences, as opposed to intrinsic qualities, are potentially reducible in that they can be functionalized, on the grounds that they ultimately result in behaviours—and, what’s more, different behaviours with different instances of qualia differentiation. As an example of the relevance of qualia differences, as opposed to qualia as intrinsic properties, Kim introduces the “traffic lights analogy,” which argues that what each of the colors of a traffic light represents—“go,” “stop,” or “slow down”—does not matter.¹¹ It also does not matter if some drivers’ color spectra are inverted. There will not be car accidents assignable to this disparity in color attribution since, regardless of the phenomenal property of the experience, it will evoke the same law of road traffic control, and therefore enable a similar behaviour in all drivers. What ultimately matters is that in practicality, all drivers will have the ability to differentiate qualia and adjust their behaviour accordingly. Kim expresses this thought with the following conclusion: “Therefore, two persons whose color spectra are inverted with respect to each other can exhibit the same discriminative behaviour.”¹² This observable difference in behaviour, with relation to differences amongst qualia can, hereafter, in the domain of cognitive science, be functionalized and hence reduced. Therefore, a physicalist might both fail to account for intrinsic phenomenal properties or qualia, and still be able to preserve phenomenal differences or differences amongst qualia.

By following Kim’s process, one has apparently succeeded in saving qualia differences from epiphenomenalism. However, one has lost qualia as intrinsic properties to epiphenomenalism. The question now remains: how problematic is this for our understanding of ourselves as agents? Kim’s answer is that cognition and agency lie in the intentional do-

¹⁰ Jaegwon Kim, *Physicalism, or something near enough* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 170.

¹¹ Although the order of the traffic lights or other factors matter, Kim insists on it being specifically the color that does not. Kim, *Philosophy of Mind, Op. Cit.*, 333.

¹² Kim, *Physicalism, or something near enough, Op. Cit.*, 171.

main, which was saved through functional reduction, and thus our status as cognizers and agents is saved: “The mental residue encompasses only qualitative states of consciousness, and does not touch the intentional/cognitive domain. And it is in this domain that our cognition and agency are situated.”¹³ This implies that to lose qualia as intrinsic properties to epiphenomenalism is not problematic for our agency, given that agency is exclusively situated in the intentional domain.

I contend that losing qualia to epiphenomenalism does, in fact, entail a significant loss of agency. I suggest approaching the problem backwards and analyzing the desideratum first, that is, to begin with agency. As was mentioned above, agency implies the ability to recognize oneself as a rational agent endowed with the capacity to act as a result of one’s cognitive activity. It also implies, then, knowledge of one’s own actions. Where agency confers autonomy upon its agent, and the agent has first-person authority over one’s own thoughts, it follows that an agent can engage in metacognition and use whatever one gathers from that activity in one’s actions. Insofar as qualia are defined as “the ways in which objects and events around me, and in me, present themselves in my experience,” one must accept that one does have knowledge of those experiences, and does have direct access to those phenomenal properties.¹⁴

Moreover, these intrinsic qualities are made available to other cognitive functions within one, such as thought, knowledge, perception, and language—all necessary to the communication of this phenomenal consciousness and sensory experience. How is it that one knows others also experience firsthand these same phenomenal properties? After all, it can be assumed that by this point in the paper the reader and author of this paper share a common understanding of the meaning of the word “quale,” and, thus, that both understand what qualia are; how can this assumption about qualia and their familiarity to any given person be so certain?

¹³ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹⁴ Kim, *Philosophy of Mind, Op. Cit.*, 295.

Art as a Medium by which to Understand a Relationship between Qualia and Agency

My answer is that there are large amounts of testimonies to qualia, with which one grows familiar very early on—in the arts, notably. Let me take the example of poetry; surely, everyone can recall an instance of imagery in a poem that is so strong and genuine-feeling.¹⁵ Its strength and genuineness are precisely because of the very thing that it evokes in one: a quale—the quale of a particular kind of moment. Art both serves as testimony to those inner experiences, and communicates them effectively to others.¹⁶ Through art, in all its variety of media, the quale experienced instantly by one person can be experienced indefinitely by another—be it the quale of an exact moment (represented by a realist painting, for example) or the quale of a unique association of sensory experiences (as, perhaps, expressed in a metaphor).

Beyond the immediate sensory communication of a quale, from its presentation by the artist to its reception by the beholder, there is the originating act of creation itself. Where inspiration comes from for a poet, for example, is an exceptional understanding of a given quale—either sparked spontaneously in the mind or experienced directly in the world. “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?”¹⁷ There is something it is like, for William Shakespeare, to be (or experience, in some sense) a summer day, and there is something it is like to be (or experience, in some sense) the subject referred to as “thee” in his “Sonnet 18”—and both emerging qualia happen to overlap. Without the capacity to experience, access, and further inscribe qualia in the creative cycle, there is no possibility to move from the step of inspiration to that of creation whereby a work of art is accomplished in the first place. If epiphenomenalism were to win over qualia, Shakespeare could never have been able to create his famous “Sonnet 18,” thus expressing qualia through the use of language. This is because epiphenomenalism holds the view that qualia are causally inefficacious—

¹⁵ Notice the not-so-innocent technical term “imagery”—imagery: image: mental visual likeness: qualia.

¹⁶ Editor’s Note: for an extended explication of this premise, cf. Leo Tolstoy, *What is Art?*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Penguin Classics, 1996).

¹⁷ William Shakespeare, *The Complete Sonnets and Poems*, ed. Colin Burrow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Sonnet 18, 417.

and if that were the case, and qualia were lost to epiphenomenalism, then qualia could not cause within one other mental states and neural states that would enable one to participate in the creation, communication, and even deep feeling of art.

Two points must be noted before moving on. Firstly, to account for qualia, and thus to save them within the causal realm of things, means that it remains possible to account for a causal connection between qualia and other mental states, such as emotions (thus allowing a person to feel something after experiencing a quale, or to have an emotion be evoked when she sees any kind of image or reads a text, for example). Second, it is primordial to understand that, although qualia differences can matter functionally, as Kim explains at length, qualia also matter in and of themselves—it is not important that you get a different quale when looking at a Renoir, than when looking at a Picasso—it intrinsically matters that you experience the quale you experience when looking at a Renoir, because it will evoke specific other mental states in you, which, in turn, will participate in a causal cycle.

In addition to the essential role of qualia in the creative process, it is interesting to expand on a point briefly introduced earlier: this section has more or less directly answered our question—how is it that one knows others too experience firsthand these same phenomenal properties?—through an analysis of art and the sharing of artistic expression. The answer leads to yet another conclusion relevant to our understanding of ourselves as agents: because we are inevitably so familiar with qualia, we understand that others, too, experience these same phenomenal properties.¹⁸ This understanding that we share something so fundamental as certain kinds of mental events provides us with a trust necessary to further communication amongst ourselves; it enables a justified predisposition to share experiences with one another, with the feeling that the other will understand. Qualia, with their distinctive aspect as fundamental blocks of creation and art, thus contribute to the feeling, supported with empirical evidence, of belonging to the human social circle of life. Thus, not only do qualia play a primordial role in the creative process, they also participate in the con-

¹⁸ *Cf.*, the analysis on art and artistic expression, above.


solidation of human trust and relationships, historically frequently through art.

Art is traditionally one of the most widely used and creative modes of expression and action, on personal, social, cultural and political levels. One can thus see how losing qualia to epiphenomenalism would entail an incommensurable loss for our agency: the lost capacity to create and share with others certain ideas in our minds. It is the very capacity of human beings to create and express themselves artistically throughout history that is at stake. Thus, it is essentially problematic that physicalism fails to account for qualia as intrinsic properties—despite the fact that it accounts for qualia differences.

This paper has first sought to shortly explore philosophy of mind as a dynamic field, and engage in dialogue with world-renowned scholar Jaegwon Kim's writing, specifically on the topic of physicalism and qualia. I explained the relationship between physicalism and qualia through the lens of functional reduction as per Kim, before signifying the vital necessity to ward off epiphenomenalism from qualia in all its forms. I sought to demonstrate that, although it is within physicalism's scope to account for qualia differences, inasmuch as this theory fails to account for qualia as intrinsic properties, it follows that physicalism also fails to account for an essential part of what constitutes our agency. Indeed, I showed through a colorful use of art as a medium of human connection on a myriad of levels, that losing qualia to epiphenomenalism is highly problematic for our understanding of ourselves as agents insofar as it does not enable us to fully exploit some of our innate and natural tendencies: to create, as well as to feel and share with others some of the experiences underlying these very creations.

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ALEC STRATTON-LAKE

Locke and the Great Injustice

ABSTRACT: Locke has traditionally been understood as positing a theory of personal identity in which memory is the sole criterion. This theory has been objected to fiercely and has been almost universally abandoned. In this paper I explore the possibilities that Locke did not in fact have such a view on personal identity, and discuss whether a different interpretation of Locke can overcome the objections attached to the traditional interpretation.

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Introduction

A theory of personal identity must tell us two things. Firstly, it must give us a necessary and sufficient list of criteria for what it is to be a person, i.e., what distinguishes people from non-people. Secondly, it must tell us how a person at some given time remains identical to a person at some other time. In other words, a theory of identity must tell us what is required to be x and what it is to remain x during a period of time.

Discussions about what constitutes a person stretch back to the Ancient Greeks. John Locke, though, can be seen as providing revolutionary insight on the topic. Locke separated the identity conditions for humans and persons, and thus attempted to move away from the anthropocentric focus of personal identity that had influenced the discussion of the topic throughout history.¹⁹ Locke's theory of personal identity was defined in his work *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. While Locke has been applauded for his contributions, his supposed conception of personal identity has been almost universally condemned. Objections to Locke's theory have been accepted as damning, and the attention of philosophy has moved on. While some claim that a Lockean train of thought runs through modern conceptions of identity, any real semblance to Locke's original position has been abandoned.²⁰

So where did Locke go so tragically wrong? On the contrary to any true tragedy, Locke's mistake is merely semantic, rather than theoretical, as most have thought. Because of a lack of clarity and his cumbersome use of terminology, many have left Locke's intuitive, workable theory of personal identity by the wayside. In this paper I will argue that

¹⁹ The process of contrasting humans to animals in order to better understand personal identity can be witnessed in the works of Plato, through those of Descartes, and beyond.

²⁰ Cf. three such examples: Brian Garrett, *Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness* (London: Routledge, 1998); Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); Peter Unger, *Identity, Consciousness, and Value* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). While these philosophers agree about Locke's focus on the psychology of persons to determine the criteria for personal identity, they diverge from the traditional reading of Locke in a key way: Garrett, Shoemaker, and Unger all deny that memory is the sole requirement for personhood to persist. This is, however, Locke's key claim, according to most commentators. Also, contemporary discussion of personal identity often centers around "quasi-memories," a concept that was formulated much later than Locke's writings.

Locke has been grossly misunderstood, and that Locke's commentators have been attacking a theory he did not hold and criticising ideas he did not think. It is necessary, however, to first detail the traditional reading of Locke and its objections in order to frame the subsequent discussion.

The Traditional Locke and his Mistakes

Locke has often been thought to claim that a person is a "thinking intelligent being."²¹ This idea is born from Locke's distinction between "man" and "person." The reason for this distinction is that our conception of what a person is does not seem to involve a particular kind of body, since we can reasonably attach personhood to anything possessing the ability for rational discourse. During the discussion between what distinguishes man and person, Locke somewhat strangely uses an example of a particularly intelligent parrot.²² In this example, Locke recounts the words of a man who had discoursed with Prince Maurice. During this encounter, the prince told the tale of his meeting a parrot. While governing in Brazil, Prince Maurice came into contact with an old and seemingly rational parrot. When first introduced to the prince, the parrot displayed the ability to converse in a manner that would lead one to believe it to be completely fluent in Portuguese. While the parrot certainly seemed to be a sarcastic and dismissive individual (the parrot jokes about the prince's Dutch heritage, and refers to him as some "some General or other"²³), it demonstrated intelligence comparable to that of humans. But, one would not then conclude that, because of its intelligence, the parrot is in fact a human. Such a thought would be ridiculous because the parrot lacks all the physical features characteristic of humans. It is not, then, rationality that distinguishes humans ["man"] from other animals ["persons"], but rather humans' unique physical structure. Given that a human is defined by a particular type of body, the question remains: what is a person?

The example of the parrot is supposed to engender a likeness between ourselves and the parrot, thus leading to

²¹ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1999), 318.

²² *Ibid.*, 317.

²³ *Ibid.*

Locke's more reasonable assertion: what defines a person is not biology, but rationality.²⁴ This example brings forth the intuition that our unique psychology is the fundamental component of our personal identity.²⁵

The parrot example can certainly be considered effective insofar as its intuitive appeal continues to be discussed to this day.²⁶ But let us move on from explicating Locke's criterion for personhood. For one, many might justifiably claim that the traditional account is adequately backed by the text in this area. Further, while the position is hardly free from contention, it is still reasonable. What I want to focus on, instead, is the range of philosophical consequences of claiming that a person is a thinking intelligent being, and Locke's criterion for persons to *remain identical* over time. It is in these two areas that I believe the traditional reading of Locke has misconstrued Locke's thinking.

The traditional reading of Locke's criterion for persons to remain identical over time is usually based on such excerpts:

Being ... can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.²⁷

As far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then.²⁸

Consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended—should it be to ages past—unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has

²⁴ Another way of thinking about this is to imagine that your mind has been transferred to the body of a parrot: most would then believe that, although you are now a parrot, you are still a person because of your persisting psychology.

²⁵ Imagine a scenario in which your memory disappeared and, consequently, your personality completely changed. It seems reasonable to believe that the identity of the resulting person has been affected in some way.

²⁶ As said above, the idea that psychological capacities determine personhood has been the driving force for much contemporary discussion on personal identity (*cf.* footnote two).

²⁷ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, 318.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 319.

the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong.²⁹

Such excerpts are usually interpreted as Locke speaking about remembrance, wherein “consciousness” is used as a synonym for “memory.” So, when Locke talks about the extension of consciousness he is really talking about the reach of memory. If such an interpretation is accurate, then what Locke is saying in these passages is that in order for x at t_1 [time 1] to be identical to y at t_2 , y must be able to remember being x at t_1 .

There are numerous objections to this theory—too many, in fact, to look at all of them in this paper. As such, I shall just focus on the objections by Thomas Reid and Joseph Butler. The reason for my focus on both Reid and Butler is twofold: first, they provide the most famous and widely referenced critiques of Locke; second, their objections continue to shape contemporary formulations of personal identity, which focus, as Locke did, on the psychology of a person. As such, Locke’s potential to overcome such objections is relevant to today’s discussion on personal identity.

Reid objected as follows: if memory is the sufficient constituent of personal identity, then one law of logic to which all have assumed personal identity adheres—transitivity—is not in fact applicable. The law of transitivity states that if x is identical to y , and y is identical to z , then x is identical with z . The problem is that if personal identity does not adhere to the law of transitivity, then truly absurd results occur. Reid famously characterised these absurdities with his “Senile General Case.”³⁰ In this scenario there is a boy who steals an apple and, thus, receives a flogging. Later in time there is a distinguished officer who remembers being the boy who stole the apple. Even later in time there is an old general who remembers being the distinguished officer, but not the boy who stole the apple. Now, Locke’s theory supposedly states that the reach of your memory is the reach of your identity; thus, the general is the officer and the officer is the boy, but the general is not the boy, since

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 324.

³⁰ Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, (Boston: Phillips, 1858), 347.

the general does not remember being the boy. The situation detailed by Reid is obviously ridiculous, and is not something anyone would want to admit as a logical consequence of one's theory.

Another problem for Locke is circularity. Butler was the first to note that "consciousness of personal identity, presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity."³¹ Butler's point is that *x* can only remember doing some act *because x* is the same person who did that act. If *x* purportedly remembered doing an act, but it was in fact *y* who did that act, then *x* would not be remembering but, instead, would merely believe that he is remembering. Memory thus presupposes personal identity since, for it to be true that *you* remember doing something, it must be true that *you* did that thing in the way that your memory specifies. Because the idea of memory involves personal identity, memory cannot constitute personal identity. If one was to define personal identity in terms of memory, one would provide a circular definition—for to understand what consists in personal identity, we must understand memory, but to understand memory, we must understand what consists in personal identity!

What we are left with, then, is a theory that is both absurd (insofar as it denies that the law of transitivity applies to personal identity) and circular (since the theory of personal identity assumes that which it attempts to define). However, I do not believe these objections are reasons to give up on Locke's account. While it is evident from what Reid and Butler have established—that a theory which establishes memory as the sole criterion for the persistence of a person is bound to fail—I want to distance Locke from such a theory. I believe that Locke had something far different in mind than the theory that has been traditionally ascribed to him. My primary objective is to capture the correct account of Locke's theory of personal identity. However, an interesting consequence of my reformulation of the traditional reading of Locke is that it results in Reid and Butler's criticisms being inapplicable to Locke.

³¹ Joseph Butler, "Of Personal Identity," in J. Perry, *Personal Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 100.

Locke's Motivation

If we are going to accurately represent Locke's thought, it is necessary to adopt a more comprehensive view of Locke's work. We should move away from reviewing individual excerpts from the chapter "Identity and Diversity" (the chapter in which personal identity is discussed), and review the chapter as a whole. The reason for this is that the later parts of the chapter are usually ignored when interpreting Locke's theory of personal identity. Presumably, the philosophic community has thought these sections to be superfluous. I think, though, that it is in these very sections that Locke reveals his true motives for including the chapter on identity. With an understanding of his motives, we can move toward a better understanding of his writings.

Between pages 331-333 (1690 pagination) Locke discusses the idea of people getting their just desserts. It is important to ask why he does this. The traditional reading of Locke claims that he is making a metaphysical assertion about personal identity being constituted by memory. If this is accepted, then it seems inevitable to conclude that by focusing on just desserts Locke is simply exploring the practical consequences of his theory of personhood. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that Locke is just following a theoretical exercise in order to fully explicate his theory, for that would involve ignoring key terminology that Locke introduces to explain what the concept "person" involves.

Locke states unequivocally that "person" is a "forensic term": a term, which, when used correctly, appropriates "actions and their merit."³² If person is a forensic term, then personhood is directly related to the court of law, and its correct usage would be limited to the fields of justice and ethics. It could be that Locke is just making an offhand remark, which should not be seriously considered. This is certainly a move that many traditional interpreters would make. Ignoring Locke's attempts to limit the application of personal identity to ethical discussions is too dismissive, though, considering that Locke's explication of personal identity is coloured throughout by moralistic undertones—as seen, in part, by how the majority of his examples used to explain his theory of identity involve the idea of punish-

³² Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, 331.

ment. For instance, consider Locke's example involving Socrates.³³ In this example, Socrates sleepwalks and generally acts as if he is awake when he is asleep. However, when Socrates wakes he has no memory of the actions he performed while sleeping. Locke claims that it would be completely unjust to punish the "awake Socrates" who has absolutely no memory of the "sleeping Socrates."

This example is an attempt show that true identity does not consist in the identity of one's body. This means that Locke is arguing that, because it is unjust for the "awake Socrates" to be considered the same person as the "sleeping Socrates," *they cannot be the same person*. But justice has nothing to do with the criterion for a particular being a certain kind of object. Justice is an ethical concern, while identity is a metaphysical concern. Locke's argument can only be understood, then, if we understand Locke conception of a person as an *ethical* one, i.e. a conception of a person that is only applicable to the field of ethics. As such, the idea that "person" is a forensic term cannot be dismissed; not only does it designate the ethical status of the object the term "person" is attached to, but it also limits the circumstances to which the term is applicable.³⁴

And, I should note, I understand that it is controversial to claim that Locke's conception of personhood is ethical, since it greatly limits the scope of Locke's work on personal identity. But, at the very least, it must be agreed for the moment that the idea of just desserts is of great importance to Locke in his writings on personal identity, and certainly influences his motive for writing the chapter "Identity and Diversity."

With Locke's motivations more concretely understood, it is possible to determine more accurately which excerpts should be given the most attention. With ethics playing such an important role in Locke's thinking through this chapter, contrary to the traditional line of thought, the passages involving just punishment should be held in high regard. For example, within one such passage, Locke discusses how God will ensure justice: "God; who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is con-

³³ *Ibid.*, 326

³⁴ This "ethical status" would confer moral responsibility for one's actions if the term "person" is to appropriate actions and their merit.

cerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it.”³⁵ The problem with the traditional reading of Locke is that it cannot make sense of what is being said here. Locke is claiming that God will protect us from incorrect memories being transferred into our consciousness so that just punishment and reward is ensured. But under the traditional reading, memory is the sole constituent of personal identity. The notion of an “incorrect memory” would be a nonsensical one, since everything I remember would necessarily be a part of my past. If the passage is to make sense, then, there must be something underlying my first-person experiences that is necessary for personal identity in order to ensure that I am punished justly. The idea that memory is sufficient for the persistence of personal identity is thus ruled out by Locke, himself!

Locke’s Ethos

I am willing to acknowledge that limiting Locke’s claims about personhood to the field of ethics is controversial. I shall thus provide another argument against the traditional reading—an argument that does not rely on a purely ethical interpretation of personhood. Rather, I shall appeal to the simpler idea that when reading Locke, who was indeed an intelligent individual, one should try to formulate a coherent theory, rather than look for only errors. Reflecting on the objections listed in the second section above, “The Traditional Locke and his Mistakes,” it is obvious that “memory as the sole criterion for personal identity” is implausible. For starters, the traditional interpretation looks inaccurate because Locke makes remarks that imply that he also realises the implausibility of memory playing such a role. Locke notes this when criticising the view that personal identity consists in the continuity of thinking substance. Locke states that:

Few would think they had reason to doubt
... the same thinking thing would always be
present, and as would be thought, evidently
the same to itself. But that which seems to
make this difficulty is this ... there being no

³⁵ Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Op. Cit.*, 331.

moment in our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eye, in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another.³⁶

In this passage Locke rejects the idea that personal identity consists in the sameness of a thinking substance because if the same thinking substance was always present, then it would always appear the same to itself. Therefore, memories would never fade in and out of the mind's eye. But, of course, memories are not like this. It is evident, though, that this objection would also work against the theory that holds that the persistence of personal identity is the continuation of memory. Personal identity, unlike a memory, does not fade in and out. It is ridiculous to propose that by forgetting my identity, my relation to some past person can be altered. If we are to believe that Locke did not realise such things, then interpreting him becomes an exercise in futility. Essentially, it would be senseless to ascribe to Locke, who was clearly an intelligent human, the very theory that he identified as flawed.

Where Did We Go Wrong?

It is worth asking, seeing that the traditional reading handles Locke's text so poorly, why it has reached such wide acceptance in philosophical circles. The main problem for Locke is that he does not use the term "consciousness" unambiguously. Sometimes Locke is using "consciousness" to refer to memory, and sometimes he is using it to refer to some other mental state. For instance, Locke often uses the term in the phrase "the consciousness of past actions" or "the consciousness of past life," as is seen when he writes: "How far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it."³⁷

In this context, it is obvious that he is using "consciousness" as a synonym for memory. But this cannot be the only sense in which Locke uses the word, because, if we attempt to understand Locke's usage of "consciousness" as synonymous

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 319.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 321.

with “memory,” then some of his passages become nonsensical. Take the following excerpt for example: “Consciousness ... is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.”³⁸ It would simply be misplaced to read Locke as continuing the former sense of “consciousness.” Looking at the first clause of the excerpt, we could perhaps understand the idea of memory being essential to thinking, for it is difficult to conceive of an organism being able to formulate any kinds of thought with no ability to remember at all. But the fact that awareness of one’s perceptions is essential for perception itself in no way relates to the notion that memory is essential for thought. How is the necessity of self-awareness for perception supposed to illuminate us on the relation between memory and thought?

This excerpt is only sensible if we determine that Locke is using consciousness in a more common-sense form. Instead of remembrance, as Locke makes clear in the second clause of the quote, this “consciousness” is a cognition of one’s own thought, a self-awareness of one’s mental activity. I believe this to sufficiently demonstrate that it is this conflation of two uses of “consciousness” in his writings that has led to the traditional reading of Locke.

The Accurate Interpretation

Thus far, I have argued that Locke’s motives for including the chapter on “Identity and Diversity” involved enriching his position on ethics. To this effect, Locke designates “person” as a forensic term. The traditional interpretation of Locke cannot make sense of such a conception of a person (*cf.* the above section), and, as such, it is necessary to leave behind the idea that memory is sufficient for the persistence of a person.

Now, for an object to be a person at any time, it must be a “thinking, intelligent being.”³⁹ Later on, Locke further clarifies this by restricting personhood to “intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery.”⁴⁰ It is evident

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 318.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 331.

that, by defining a person in this manner, Locke is making a conscious link between the criterion for being a person and that of being a moral agent. It could even be said that he is merging the two terms. Clearly, the need for a deep connection between persons and moral agents is obvious. Locke's conception of a person is an ethical one, and only moral agents (i.e. intelligent, self-responsible beings) can follow any code of ethics.

So, how can a thinking, intelligent being x at t_1 be identical with thinking intelligent being y at t_2 ? For Locke, consciousness is the key. And, let it be known that when I use the term "consciousness," I am referring to that which, for Locke, is *not* synonymous with memory. Locke states that consciousness provides us with a peculiar perspective on our own mental lives. This perspective is essential to thinking in the same way that it is impossible for one to "perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive."⁴¹ Therefore, according to Locke, x at t_1 is identical to y at t_2 if they share the same awareness of thought, the same "consciousness."

The immediate issue that arises from this claim is how we determine what it means for something to share the same awareness of thought. Unfortunately, Locke is hardly illuminating on this matter. Presumably Locke does not require a person to have a continued awareness of every one of his thoughts in order to persist through a period of time. To hold such a view would make it incredibly rare, if not impossible, for a person to persist longer than a few moments. But, if we are to understand Locke's conception of a person as an ethical one, then it is reasonable to limit the required scope of awareness to what is of real value to a person in contexts that are the primary concerns for a code of ethics (e.g. situations in which it is relevant to ask whether this is right or wrong). Continued awareness of fundamental beliefs, powerful desires, important intentions, and so forth, should then be sufficient for the persistence of a person.

We can see, then, the modern and more reasonable (compared to traditional Lockean theory) take on the psychological approach to identity emerging here. But if it is true that Locke's thoughts are much closer to those like Garrett,

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 318.

Shoemaker, and Unger, why did he not simply state that the persistence of a person relies on the persistence of particular mental phenomena? Why would he frame his thought in terms of awareness?

What I have emphasised repeatedly throughout this paper is that Locke is using “person” as a forensic term. It is a term that, in Locke’s eyes, is supposed to appropriate “actions and their merit”⁴² so that persons can be rewarded or punished appropriately. But Locke thinks that one should only be punished for actions that he is aware of having done, for otherwise “what difference is there between that punishment and being created miserable?”⁴³ This is why Locke speaks of a continued awareness of mental phenomena rather than a mere persistence of these mental phenomena. He is concerned with only the *ethical* aspect of personhood.

With all this talk of awareness, it could be easy to slip back into the habit of conflating consciousness with memory. It is evident that due to the relationship between consciousness and thinking that it would be impossible to remember something without being conscious. But it is also evident that the converse does not hold true: I can be conscious and not remember something. It would be absurd to suggest that at every moment during which I am thinking, I am at that same moment remembering something.

This, however, is not to say that memory has no part to play. It would be irresponsible to suggest that Locke reserved no place for memory in the context of personal identity, especially after the amount of references to it within “Diversity and Identity.” Memory is an aspect of consciousness in the sense that one cannot be remembering something while unconscious. Thus, memory provides us with the ability to recognise how far back our identity reaches. If we can correctly remember doing something at *t₁*, then we, necessarily, were *conscious* at *t₁*. Further, Locke does not suggest that memory is infallible. He recognises that due to various factors, “ideas in the mind quickly fade and often vanish quite out of the understanding.”⁴⁴ Remembrance is not a perfect way of gathering evidence of identity, but it is, nonetheless, a reliable one. Memory,

⁴² *Ibid.*, 331.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 134.

then, plays an important role for Locke, though not the same role as has been assigned by the traditional interpretations⁴⁵.

To summarise, then, my interpretation of Locke is as such: Locke believes that a person is a thinking, intelligent being. A person at t_1 is identical to a person at t_2 if there is a persistence of consciousness between times 1 and 2. And, we can have evidence of this persistence if the person at t_1 can remember actions performed by the person at t_2 .

Conclusion

I have already given my argument for why the traditional interpretation of Locke is unsuitable, but I do not want it to seem as though I am arguing for my view by simply disparaging those who disagree with me. I think there are numerous positive reasons for why this interpretation should be considered faithful to Locke's intentions. Firstly, and most importantly, this interpretation takes seriously Locke's consideration of "person" as a forensic term. This is an important consideration since Locke introduces the term to clarify his conception of a person. By emphasising the importance of "person" as a forensic term, the consequent reading limits the scope of Locke's claims about personal identity to the field of *ethics*.

Secondly, this interpretation takes into account that Locke used "consciousness" in different senses. It notes the fact that when Locke uses the term "consciousness," he is some-

⁴⁵ It is not only for the sake of literary comprehension that one must allow for the possibility that Locke used the term "consciousness" and "memory" synonymously in many circumstances. Such interpretation also clarifies the metaphysical implications of Locke's view. If one is to understand Locke as using the term "consciousness" to refer solely to an awareness of fundamental beliefs, powerful desires, important intentions, and so forth, then it would appear Locke is making some controversial metaphysical assertions. Locke seems to have believed that God ensures that consciousnesses are not transferred among different people. If one is to understand Locke as using the term "consciousness" to refer only to an awareness of fundamental beliefs, powerful desires and important intentions, then it would appear that Locke is claiming that God must be presupposed to suppose that consciousness is persistent and personal! However, if we read Locke as using "consciousness," in this context, as a synonym for "memory," then Locke's assertion merely means that God must be presupposed to rule out the possibility of one person having veridical memories of another person. If God does not exist, then Locke's entire theory would not collapse; in this case, it would only mean that memory is a less reliable tool than previously believed.

times referring to a certain kind of inner awareness, while at other times referring to the act of remembrance. Distinguishing between these two senses of “consciousness” is necessary because, aside from the fact that this is an entirely understandable stylistic slip-up, it also renders many of Locke’s passages nonsensical. Distinguishing between the two senses of “consciousness” also provides clarity to passages that are otherwise needlessly opaque.⁴⁶

Finally, it is reasonable to suggest that when trying to interpret eminent philosophers such as Locke, it is the burden of the interpreter to provide the most workable account of the philosopher’s theory. To do otherwise would be a great injustice. My account of Locke meets this requirement by providing a theory that is reasonable, insofar as it is in accordance with the popular intuition that our psychology is an important component of our identity.

Of course, even a reasonable theory can be inaccurate when it is attempting to explicate another’s thoughts. Is this interpretation of Locke inaccurate? Is my interpretation any less vulnerable to the objections directed toward the traditional interpretation? As memory now occupies a solely epistemic role, it appears that Reid and Butler’s criticisms miss the mark entirely. Reid’s criticism that memory cannot constitute personal identity because memory is not transitive is no longer relevant. Memory is simply an evidential tool, so it does not matter whether it is transitive. Consciousness is transitive, so it is perfectly reasonable for Locke to attribute the root of personal identity to it. Butler’s point that the conflation of identity with memory would lead to a circular definition of personal identity again means nothing to Locke since he is not attempting to define identity as a continuation of memory.

Of course, I am not going to take the position that Locke’s theory of identity is invulnerable to criticism. Now that a new formulation of Locke’s theory has appeared, new objections will follow. On the contrary, my point is that such objections should not be focused on questions concerning the metaphysical nature of personhood, but rather the ethical consequences of Locke’s conception of a person. My hope is that that my reading of Locke’s writings will clear up

⁴⁶ Cf. Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, *Op. Cit.*, 318.

some misunderstanding. Although, I also wish for my interpretation to guide further discussion of personal identity toward the ethical issues associated with it. For it was with the ethical issues concerning personal identity that Locke was truly interested.

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**MICHAELINA DENEKA AND
ALINA NAKOS**

**Manifesto for a Philosophically
Justified Commune**

ABSTRACT: This work calls for the creation of “The Commune,” a true community of individuals who work together in solidarity to harmoniously uphold the interests of all. While Marxist ideology structures The Commune, the authors utilize principles from John Dewey to develop a plan that prevents the historically documented descent of such communes into totalitarianism. The philosophical justification behind their manifesto further looks to Engels, Hobbes, Moeller, Debord, Morelly, and Diderot to elaborate a societal model—first delineating The Commune’s precepts and ideology, then closely considering its government, structure of labor, and education—that fosters the collective harmony capitalism has failed to cultivate.

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Introduction

“The Commune” will be a community of individuals living and working in harmony, with all holding the interests of the community as their primary goal. From an economic standpoint, it will be primarily Marxist in ideology and structure. Through the establishment of a strongly held voluntary nature of The Commune, we hope to avoid a descent into totalitarianism, which has historically plagued communist states. Thus established, the good of the individual will be upheld. John Dewey eloquently illustrates the sort of community we hope to establish in *Democracy and Education*.⁴⁷ Our goal is the realization of “a society in which every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more perceptible—which breaks down the barriers of distance between them. It denotes a state of affairs in which the interest of each in his work is uncoerced and intelligent: based upon its congeniality to his own aptitudes.”⁴⁸ The Commune depends upon the individual just as the individual depends upon The Commune; this symbiotic relationship is the highest good, the founding principle of communal life.

We will attempt, in this manifesto, to outline a philosophical justification for such a commune. This is a necessary endeavor inasmuch as The Commune is to be derived from voluntary participation. While the contract theory proposed by Thomas Hobbes—that the only way to ensure the safety and protection of rights of the individual was to “confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, ... to submit their Wills, every one to his Will,” and that this submission was the origin of the state—is an easily falsifiable theory historically speaking, it is still relevant in that it testified to “a growing belief that the state existed to satisfy human needs and could be shaped by human intention and volition.”⁴⁹ When the state is seen not as “a necessary manifestation of some supreme and over-

⁴⁷ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 317.

⁴⁹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: or The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1886), ch. XVII, 84 and John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004), 27, respectively.

ruling principles,” but rather as something man-made, the care that must be taken in its making is self-evident.⁵⁰

Precepts

1. All actions taken by members should be taken with consideration of the community as the first and foremost interest. Dewey’s claim that “a being connected with other beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of others into account,” compelling justifies this precept.⁵¹
2. The rights of the individual will be protected as much as possible, insofar as they do not conflict with the interests of the community. These rights include:
 - a. The fulfillment of basic human needs, defined by Abraham Maslow in his “Theory of Human Motivation” as physiological necessities such as food, water, and shelter—which will be provided as shared resources in The Commune—as well as higher-order needs such as a sense of belonging and of purpose, which will be achieved through participation in the community and recognition of each individual’s contributions.⁵²
 - b. The ability to express dissent and have their concerns met with due respect. We reject the Hobbesian notion that “he that complaineth of injury from his Sovereigne, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself.”⁵³ While the governance of The Commune will derive from the people, we respect that situations may arise in which The Commune inadvertently acts in a manner harmful to an individual, and uphold an individual’s right to civil dissent in such a situation.
 - c. The right to leave the commune at any time; participation in The Commune is on a strictly voluntary basis. It is from the shared desire to participate in

⁵⁰ Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, *Op. Cit.*, 25.

⁵¹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *Op. Cit.*, 12.

⁵² Kendra Cherry, “Hierarchy of Needs,” available at *About.com: Psychology*.

⁵³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, *Op. Cit.*, 84.

communal living that The Commune will attain its cohesion.⁵⁴

- d. The ability to use free time for whatever purpose the individual chooses, insofar as it is not destructive to the community. As long as the individual has adequately contributed to the community (*cf.*, section three, “Quotas,” under “Labor,” below), they are free to pursue personal interests.
3. The most severe punishment to be utilized in the community is expulsion from the community. Minor crimes—to be defined as any action which poses harm to The Commune—will be addressed by the Council on a case-by-case basis. Reparation for harm caused, not retaliation, will be the primary motivation for any penal actions; punishments will be enacted to restore the good of the community, not to harm or humiliate an individual. We agree with Hans-Georg Moeller’s position in *The Moral Fool* that the death penalty does not serve as an adequate deterrent to justify its use, and that the idea of retaliation through punishment adds a moralizing factor not necessary for an effective system of justice.⁵⁵
4. All members of the community should consider each other as family, necessary components of a larger entity. As such, no member will treat another member in a way that he or she would not consider acceptable for one’s own family.
5. There will be no sense of personal ownership in The Commune; materials and resources are to be shared by all. Should an individual accrue more resources than he or she has need for, they ought to be returned to the community so that they may be allocated to those who have need of them. Barter and trade are not allowed, as one may not trade that which is not one’s own.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ A study of North Korea, or other nations throughout history, can illustrate what we deem to be the evils inherent in a forced communist state.

⁵⁵ *Cf.*, Hans-Georg Moeller, *The Moral Fool: A Case for Amoralism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

⁵⁶ [An illuminating expansion of this precept could be uncovered through considerations of Plato’s illustration of Socrates’ ideal society described in the *Republic* (trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), Bk. II, *ff.*) and in the beginning of the *Timaeus* (trans. Peter Kalkavage (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, R. Pullings Company, 2001), 17C, *ff.*), as well as in John Stuart Mill’s discussion of the better relation between justice and utility in his *Utilitarianism* (trans. George Sher (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), ch. 5). —The Editors.]

Ideology

In order to form a true communist society, certain premises enforced by the capitalist system will need to be undermined, and others will need to be put in their place. The following is a list of the fundamental ideological principles upon which The Commune will rest and, without which, it could not function.

1) The Individual's Relationship with the Community

Capitalism has effected a dissolution of the individual: the pursuit of material goods as a goal of production makes those material goods representative of the people who work for them.⁵⁷ The elision of heterogeneous individuals by the very systems in which they work has created a homogeneous consumer culture characterized by the production of “spectacle,” a term that Guy Debord, of The Situationist Internationale, employs to represent the process by which a society produces, and then consumes, the self-defining objects of its culture up to the point when the society works entirely to produce and consume its own image, erasing the (proletariat) individual who contributes to the production:

The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as society itself, as a part of society, and as a *means of unification*. As a part of society, it is the focal point of all vision and all consciousness. But due to the very fact that this sector is *separate*, it is in reality the domain of delusion and false consciousness: the unification it achieves is nothing but an official language of universal separation.⁵⁸

It is this fundamental aspect of capitalist society that we reject. Whereas individuality in capitalism manifests and

⁵⁷ [Cf. Marx's “Estranged Labor,” in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, wherein this insight can be elaborated by the identification of two factors that effect the dissolution of the individual per his or her two different valuations: first, the actual demotion of the value/status of the individual as a producer of the goods, and then a second demotion by the destruction of the humanistic value of the individual through the onset of alienation (trans. Dirk J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1980), 106-19). —The Editors.]

⁵⁸ Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* (Detroit: Black & Red, 1983), ¶ 3.

proliferates itself as the production, possession, and semantic interpretation of objects that stand in for the self (thus replacing the self with an “image” of the self), The Commune fundamentally rejects the notion that production is intended for any means but subsistence. Thus, the individual is responsible not only for maintaining the one’s own well-being, but also (and foremost) is responsible for maintaining the well-being of the community. The Commune depends completely upon the universal acceptance and understanding of the individual’s role as contributor, where the contribution is not producing “a negation of life that has invented a visual form for itself,” but the communally recognized production of the necessities for subsistence.⁵⁹ This basic understanding of each individual’s role as contributor establishes the basis for equality. As Dewey explains:

Equality does not signify that kind of mathematical or physical equivalence in virtue of which any one element may be substituted for another. It denotes effective regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each, irrespective of physical and psychological inequalities. It is not a possession but is a fruit of the community when its action is directed by its character as a community.⁶⁰

Such “physical and psychological inequalities” have the potential to pervade even objectively contribution-oriented culture, and The Commune recognizes that the subjectivity of human interaction, even in a non-competitive sphere, may provoke conflict. As Hobbes keenly noted, “in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.”⁶¹ Accordingly, The Commune’s functionality rests on the understanding that it must internally mediate these issues. The fluidity of the governmental system, the essentiality of the quota system, and the community’s necessary complicity with “comfortable poverty” (relative to a capitalist exist-

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, ¶ 10.

⁶⁰ John Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. John McDermott (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981), 620-43, 625.

⁶¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, *Op. Cit.*, 64.

ence) all serve to ideologically assuage and replace the capitalistic dependence on interpersonal conflict.

2) Relationship of The Commune to Capitalism

Marx understood the necessity of a communist society evolving out of the surplus of capitalism. “To establish a communal domestic economy presupposes the development of machinery, of the use of natural forces and of many other productive forces. ... Without these conditions a communal economy could not ... achieve more than a monastic economy achieves.”⁶² Therefore, The Commune will in part rely on trade with capitalist society for resources that cannot be sustainably produced within the community itself. Those resources will be limited to basic medical supplies, paper, and writing instruments.⁶³

The Commune is a small entity that does not presuppose a large-scale communist revolution. The decision to pursue small-scale communism was made in order to ensure a manageable-sized community within which direct democracy could feasibly take place. In large-scale communism, democracy quickly becomes anarchy; the only advantage to the larger scale is the appropriation of industrial means of production, the valuing of which over an effective political system is a purely capitalist phenomenon. Small-scale communism presents a material problem not addressed in Marxist literature, as it is typically assumed that all the economic means of production available to the capitalist society would also be available to the communist civilization. This is not the case, because The Commune is being formed of its own accord in order to separate from capitalist society, and will have limited resources at its disposal. It is understood that, at its conception, The Commune will have no means of making medicine or writing materials.

⁶² Marx, *The German Ideology*, in *Selected Writings*, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 102-157, 143.

⁶³ [Considering the Manifesto’s well-noted reflection that it is a suggestive guide that is subject to change, the Editors infer that this list may be simply illustrative, as some communities may be able to eventually produce these goods itself, and other items may better prove to be sourced from outside (even if, initially, the assertion made below stands that, upon formation, The Commune cannot manufacture these items itself). –The Editors.]

Capitalist society can be credited with making strides in medical care. Industrialization and innovation in the field of medicine has, for the most part, eliminated the need to fear basic maladies, such as the common cold, that would otherwise be fatal. In the interests of providing for the basic physiological needs of the members of The Commune, basic medicines will be necessary.⁶⁴ The category of “basic” extends to antibiotics, items with which to treat injuries, and other items that can be utilized to cure short-term diseases. It does not extend to surgery, chemotherapy, or treatment for long-term conditions; these are valued highly by capitalist society, and therefore will be priced at a level that The Commune cannot afford.⁶⁵ If a member of The Commune is found to have an ailment that The Commune cannot provide for, their return to capitalist society to seek medical treatment will be deemed acceptable.

Writing materials will be provided for members of the commune in the interests of education and documentation. As children of The Commune will be taught to read and write, materials will necessarily be provided so that they may practice these fundamental skills. Additionally, recording of personal history and pursuit of creative activities are encouraged by The Commune, so as to provide a record for future historians of this experiment in the communist tradition.

In order to provide for these necessities, the Council will supervise the appropriation of any surplus of materials produced by the community, and will trade them for money with the capitalist society. These materials can be the organic foods produced by the community farms, the hand-made crafts and tools made by craftsmen, or any other item that the capitalist society would deem of monetary value. The money obtained in this relationship will be used to purchase the aforementioned necessities only when the need for them arises. Any addition to these assigned necessities must be gravely considered by the entire community, so as

⁶⁴ [Again, in keeping with the Manifesto’s self-identification as a guide, the editors infer the mention of “basic medicines” here to be illustrative, and not exclusive of what may be deemed necessary. The details addressed here also seem to follow from a presumed understanding of the standard of living The Commune would promote concerning preventative care. –The Editors.]

⁶⁵ [Presumably, the authors understand a nuanced argument behind this rejection of surgery, etc., and that the “value” noted is strictly economic and not moral. –The Editors.]

to avoid subscribing to the capitalist system of assigning product value based on monetary value. However, minimal trade with the capitalist world is acceptable, and peaceful coexistence with the capitalists is preferred.

3) **Redefinition of Democracy**

The Commune will exemplify the ideals of democracy, which are richer and more productive to creating harmony than isolated historical or current instantiations demonstrate. Dewey writes, “The idea of a democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes of human association. ... As far as political arrangements are concerned, governmental institutions are but a mechanism for securing to an idea channels of effective operation.”⁶⁶ Thus, The Commune may claim democratic ideals, without the necessity of preserving narrow political notions with which the term may be mistakenly be assumed to be synonymous.⁶⁷

In fact, such mistakenly understood “democratic” mechanisms often act counter to the true goals of democracy. The idea that “general suffrage, frequent elections of officials, and majority rule are sufficient to ensure the responsibility of elected rulers to the desires and interests of the public,” is a fallacious one, based on the existence of what Walter Lippmann termed the “omnicompetent” individual.⁶⁸ For such mechanisms to be adequate, each individual

⁶⁶ Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” *Op. Cit.*, 621.

⁶⁷ [The editors understand the Manifesto to be referring to confusions between social arrangements and economic systems, which could lead to narrow presumptions that all democracies must be capitalistic and all communistic systems necessarily socialistic—obviously presumptions that are historically ignorant of contemporary China being both communist and capitalistic or Poland in the early 1990’s being a type of socialist democracy, to cite two examples. —The Editors.]

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 629. [The editors consider it worthwhile to note that Lippmann was as equally concerned as Dewey with thinking through the role of democracy in contemporary society, although his thought is markedly at odds with Dewey’s optimism. Lippmann—the public intellectual, political commentator, and journalist, both a consultant and advisor to Woodrow Wilson and the recognized ‘father’ of both the creation and analysis of modern propaganda—keenly diagnosed the laxity of the citizenry’s critical thinking and pessimistically concluded their inability (and ill-suitedness) to found and maintain the sort of society this Manifesto promotes. Dewey, while agreeing in the diagnosis of the challenge contemporary democracy presented for the average citizen’s comprehension, he

must know what will be for his own good in making any political decision, a competence only possible if knowledge is taken as a function of the mind “which originated in individuals by means of isolated contact with objects.”⁶⁹ Knowledge, however, is a function of association, communication, and shared experience. This epistemological point is reflected in the governance of The Commune: the entire community is responsible for defending individual good, not individuals themselves. This is to be actualized through a rotating Council form of government (*cf.* the section “Government,” below).

True democracy, the democratic ideal upheld by The Commune, is not an alternative to other principles of communal life—as political democracy may be distinguished from feudalism, totalitarianism, etc.—but the idea of communal life itself. For the individual, this means “having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain.”⁷⁰ This idea found its expression also in Marxist philosophy, in the famous quote from his *Critique of the Gotha Program*: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”⁷¹ It is the active and conscious participation in this shared good that forms the basis of the community: “Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community.”⁷²

4) Encouraging Community Through Communication

It is necessary to actively recognize the individual’s contribution to the community in order to maintain high morale and underline the necessity of each field of labor. By joining

sharply disagreed with Lippmann’s pessimism and elitism, and believed that a ‘great community’ could and should come to be. —The Editors.]

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 623.

⁷¹ Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Thesis (1875), available at: <http://libcom.org/library/critique-of-the-gotha-program-karl-marx>.

⁷² Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” *Op. Cit.*, 624.

together for meals, the community recognizes the laborers whose work has provided for The Commune's sustenance. Furthermore, the joining of the community in one place on a daily basis fosters the opportunity for daily meetings, during which The Commune's members may socialize and any issues may be conveyed to the governmental body and the community at large. Using an informal structure (excepting the process for the implementation of a decision as outlined in the section entitled "Government," below), the meeting lasts as long as issues for discussion are raised. The daily opportunity to raise an issue at community meetings not only provides the opportunity to quickly address issues of ideological dissent and reform, but also prevents both long-term problems involving the distribution of resources and the possibility for interpersonal conflict. The Commune is able to subsist in part because of the fluidity and regular revitalization of its government.

Government

As stated prior, the government of The Commune will not be a government in any traditional sense. Traditional governments advocate for the placing of individuals in positions of power over other individuals, which breeds resentment, hostility, and class divisions. In his preface to the 1883 German edition of *The Communist Manifesto*, Friedrich Engels states that "all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating"⁷³ The Commune seeks a new sort of history by nullifying the class system and validating the inherent worth and capability of every individual. As such, the government of The Commune will be Marx's ideal "dictatorship of the proletariat," in which the gap between rulers and ruled is reduced to its lowest possible level.⁷⁴ All members of The Commune are of equal worth, and therefore are expected to be equally committed to the survival of the community. Therefore, all members of the community will be expected to participate in its leadership throughout their lives. This necessitation of leadership

⁷³ Friedrich Engels, "Preface," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in *Selected Writings*, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 157-87, 157.

⁷⁴ Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program*, *Op. Cit.*.

serves to reify the individual's commitment to The Commune's well-being.

The Commune's government will consist of a Council of eight people, over the age of majority, which is sixteen. Compared to the minimum age set for governance in most nations, that of the commune could be seen as relatively low. This disparity is due to the commune's view of immaturity as a positive capacity for growth, not a negative void or lack. "The primary condition of growth," writes Dewey, "is immaturity."⁷⁵ The young are blessed with the power of plasticity, or the ability to learn from experience, with an open-mindedness too often lost in adulthood.⁷⁶ Thus within the commune, young adults are to be held to the same standards of participation in the community as elder members, both to provide the stimulus and challenge necessary for growth, and so that The Commune may benefit from their newer and fresher input.

It is expected that, upon the appropriation of this gubernatorial method into the mental framework of members of The Commune, seeing the Council through the lens of traditional government will become less and less accurate. According to Marx, "when, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another."⁷⁷ The Council will, over time, begin to be recognized by members of The Commune as simply a tool to improve the overarching system as complications arise, with none of the suggested superiority/inferiority relationship implicit in a capitalist government.

r) Selection Process

The Council will be selected by single-draw lottery. Once a member of the community has served his or her term on the Council, he or she will not be eligible for another term until

⁷⁵ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *Op. Cit.*, 41.

⁷⁶ *Cf.*, *Ibid.*, 44.

⁷⁷ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, *Op. Cit.*, 176.

all members of the community have served a term. Once all members have served a term, the lottery cycle will begin again. Service on the Council is mandatory for every individual. Illness will be excusable, under the condition that the individual's name is put back into the lottery.

2) Term Length and Rotation

Each member of the Council will serve a four-week term. Two members will be rotated out on a weekly basis, so as to prevent complete overhaul of the Council at any time.

3) Function

The members of the Council who are in the final week of their term will serve as the Moderators during community meetings. It is a Moderator's job to ensure that order is kept at meetings, and that all voices are heard.

Members of the Council will be relieved from their respective jobs during their time of service. Their quota will be evenly distributed among other workers in their field during their time in service, so as to prohibit any loss of productivity.

The function of a Council Member is to make his or her way through the community, observing every field of work, discussing working conditions with the workers, and asking members of the community what they would like to see improved. At the end of every week the Council will meet and discuss changes that need to be made to the community. These changes are not law in and of themselves. After a Communal Dinner, the Council will propose the changes to the community, who will then vote on the matter in whatever manner they find to be the most convenient and free from corruption. If significant protestation to any of the changes exists in the community, those opposed should make their way to and discuss their qualms with a member of the Council, who is then required to discuss the problem with the other Council members. If the problem is not resolved by communication between the Council and the protestor, the Council is then required to explain the problem to the greater community and require another vote. Una-

nimity is not required for the passage of any changes, but only a significant majority, which is understood to be two thirds. If at any point this number poses a problem to the community, it may be altered, but may not fall below 51 percent (so that the minority may never exercise dictatorship over the majority) and may not rise above 80 percent (so as to not draw out the democratic process to an unmanageable length).

Labor

The structure of labor in The Commune seeks to reduce that which is so problematic in capitalist society: alienation of labor. In a capitalist society, where goods produced by the worker must be exchanged for money, the creator becomes so far removed from his or her creation as to see it as a purely alien thing. Marx writes of capitalist society:

The worker is robbed of the most essential objects not only of life but also of work. Indeed, work itself becomes a thing of which he can take possession only with the greatest effort. ... So much does the appropriation of the object appear as alienation that the more objects the worker produces, the fewer he can own, and the more he falls under the domination of his product, of capital.⁷⁸

Capitalist labor fails to necessitate the worker's pride in the product or an understanding of how the individual's labor is integral to the success of the whole. By simplifying labor divisions to two groups and distributing products equally among members of the small community, workers will be able to see their products for their true, non-monetary worth. Workers will be afforded all of the circumstances necessary to take pride in and enjoy their work, as is the natural inclination of all humans by very virtue of being human. As Marx wrote, "The first historical act of these individuals [humans], the act by which they distinguish themselves from animals is not the fact that they think but the fact that they being to produce their means of subsist-

⁷⁸ Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, in *Selected Writings*, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 54-98, 60.

ence.”⁷⁹ Humans tend towards activity and production; with the nullification of capital and consciousness of the value of their work, this tendency will be encouraged and put to use.

The following three points, developed by Étienne-Gabriel Morelly, will serve to summarize the basic principles guiding distribution of labor, the quota system, and the distribution of labor:

1. “Nothing in society will belong to anyone, either as a personal possession or as capital goods, except the things for which the person has immediate use, for either his needs, his pleasures, or his daily work.
2. “Every citizen will be a public man, sustained by, supported by, and occupied at the public expense.
3. “Every citizen will make his particular contribution to the activities of the community according to his capacity, his talent and his age; it is on this basis that his duties will be determined, in conformity with the *distributive* laws.”⁸⁰

1) Apprenticed Labor

Apprenticed labor refers to any labor that requires extensive training to be able to effectively complete. This can refer to craftsmanship, medicine, the town scribe, etc.. The terms “apprenticed” and “un-apprenticed” will be used as replacements for the capitalist terms “skilled” and “un-skilled.” The latter terms presuppose a disparity of significance and value between various types of labor and typically encourage a dismissive attitude towards any un-specialized fields. This classist mindset will be actively discouraged in The Commune.

Those who participate in apprenticed labor must show significant talent in their field. If a talented individual ex-

⁷⁹ Marx, *The German Ideology*, *Op. Cit.*, 107.

⁸⁰ Étienne-Gabriel Morelly, “Sacred and Fundamental Laws that would tear out the roots of vice and of all the evils of a society,” *Code of Nature: Or, The True Spirit of Laws*, 1755, in *Socialist Thought: A Documentary History*, ed. Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 18-31, available at: <http://www.marxists.org/subject/utopian/morelly/code-nature.htm>.

presses an interest in an apprenticed position, and the current holder of the position cannot showcase his or her merit to be superior to the other individual's, they may be removed from their position with the approval of the Council. It is necessary for both the individual and the communal good that those best suited to a particular position are those that fill it. "An occupation," writes Dewey, "is the only thing which balances the distinctive capacity of an individual with his social service. To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness."⁸¹

Apprentices for these positions are selected from among the children of the community at the age of ten. This selection process will be preceded by a year-long period of experimentation in different fields, in which the children are encouraged to make their preferences known to those who will be teaching them (*cf.* the section "Education," below). Only a certain number of apprentices may be selected for any given position, which shall be determined by the current holders of that position.

Once a person is trained in a field of apprenticed labor, he or she will be expected to hold that position and fulfill his or her duties in that position until such time as this is no longer physically possible. If the holder of an apprenticed position is unable or unwilling to continue in that field, he or she may move to un-apprenticed labor after securing another member of the community to take over in that position. Once apprenticed in a field, an individual may not choose another field that requires training. This is to prevent the waste of time and resources, and to maximize the amount of labor contributed by a fully trained individual.

2) Un-Apprenticed Labor

Un-apprenticed labor refers to any labor that requires minimal training to complete. This can refer to farming, sanitation, etc.. Those who participate in un-apprenticed labor may become apprentices in another field if a spot is vacated and they show significant aptitude for that field. Unlike apprenticed labor, un-apprenticed labor is varied and ro-

⁸¹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education, Op. Cit.*, 308.

tates on a basis of where labor is most needed. Workers may request placement in particular fields of interest to them, but only with the understanding that absolutely no position is permanent.

The possibility of the advent of capitalist favoritism of one position over the other will be prevented at all costs. According to Marx, “The division of labor in a nation leads first of all to the separation of industrial-commercial labor from agricultural labor and consequently to the separation of town and country and to a clash of their interests.”⁸² This will not be allowed to happen in The Commune, due to the close proximity of community members’ workplaces and living locations, and an understanding that the traditional notions of product value are not applicable here. It must be understood that there is no class division—The Commune is sustained for and by a classless people. Food is equally important to community survival as are material goods produced for sale to the capitalist world. (Cf. the section “Ideology,” above, for what exactly will be conveyed regarding value, and “Education” for how it shall be enforced.) It will be understood that while only a select minority may participate in apprenticed labor, un-apprenticed labor is an equally desirable path of work, due to the boundless variety it affords.

3) Quotas

Weekly quotas will be set for each individual. The individual, while required to meet the demands set by the quota, is encouraged to produce a surplus for sale to the capitalist world. (Once the demands of the quota are met, the individual may choose how to spend their spare time.)

Quotas will be initially set by those working in the field and by a purely democratic process, so that all may agree upon what is a reasonable expectation. These quotas are subject to alteration by the Council, which provides input on how much of any product is required by the community. Quotas may be altered on an individual basis in the event of injury or other malady, with the approval of the other members of the field.

⁸² Marx, *German Ideology*, *Op. Cit.*, 108.

In the event of prolonged illness in conjunction with a complete inability to work, the ill individual's quota will be distributed evenly among the other workers in that field of labor.

4) Distribution of Resources

“Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation.”⁸³ Consistent with this assertion, the resources produced by The Commune will be distributed with exact evenness to each individual. Every member of The Commune is entitled to a food supply that amounts to 2000 calories a day, as this is the amount of food that the average human requires to sustain a healthy lifestyle. All additional products, such as tools and other crafted items, will be distributed on the basis of necessity. Those who need a specifically produced item will direct their requests toward the producer of that item. Any disputed claims of necessity must be taken to the Council.

There will be no form of currency in The Commune; as Marx so eloquently put it, “the complete domination of the alienated object over man is evident in money and the complete disregard of the nature of the material.”⁸⁴ By creating a direct, personal relationship between the worker that produces an item and the worker that uses it, alienation of labor is further diminished.

Education

In The Commune, education will not be regarded as something limited solely to formal schooling; as in John Dewey's theory of progressive education, the process of growth within an individual is important—not an idealized notion of knowledge held as a fixed end. Formal schooling, however, still has a necessary place within The Commune. It serves two primary purposes:

⁸³ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, *Op. Cit.*, 172.

⁸⁴ Karl Marx, “Notes of 1844,” in *Selected Writings*, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 40-53, 49.

1. Equipping individuals with a solid ground for continued education beyond formal schooling.
2. The assimilation of the individual into the shared life of the community, which is necessary for the continuity of The Commune itself.

1) Education as Growth

The system of formal education that will take place in The Commune may hardly be recognized as formal schooling by anyone holding the current American public school system as the golden standard. In the latter system, schooling and education is seen as its own end, isolated from practical experience. This is demonstrated by the growth of standardized testing, the outcomes of which fail to demonstrate connection to relevant life skills. The material of formal instruction has become “merely the subject matter of the schools, isolated from the subject matter of life-experience.”⁸⁵

In direct contrast to this ineffective method, schooling in The Commune will be largely practical, and primarily grounded in experience. Its purpose is not to promote rote memorization of fact, but to “insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth.”⁸⁶ The role of formal schooling will be to equip the youth with the skills necessary to flourish later in life and labor, and to continue to grow and develop once formalized schooling is ended in favor of the apprenticeship cycle at age nine. They will not learn the basic facts of biological life from a book, but from planting and tending to flowers—learning firsthand how seed grows into flower, the role of sun and water. They will not recite division tables, but learn to calculate how “x” peaches could be divided among all “y” members of the community. This is to ensure that there is no duality between the subject matter of school and the actual experience of life, the latter being that from which true growth is borne.

⁸⁵ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *Op. Cit.*, 8.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 51.

It would be relevant, then, to question the necessity of formalized education in the first place. To earlier cultures, Dewey claims, “it would seem preposterous to seek out a place where nothing but learning was going on in order that one might learn.”⁸⁷ This claim has some validity, and it is for this reason that the commune will limit the extent of formal schooling; having been equipped with the tools and dispositions necessary for continued growth, they will enter into either an apprenticeship or un-apprenticed labor, where their education will be derived solely from experience and interaction with their surroundings. This type of education is, in fact, preferable to formal schooling; Dewey writes, “Education *through* occupations ... combines within itself more of the factors conducive to learning than any other method. ... It is a foe to passive receptivity. It has an end in view; results are to be accomplished.”⁸⁸ Formal schooling thus serves as a necessary precursor to this sort of learning; it instills within the individual the basic information and mental capabilities that will promote lifelong growth.

2) Education for the Communal Good

Formal education is necessary, also, for communal life. For one, a community such as The Commune is “too complex to be assimilated to *in toto*.”⁸⁹ The precepts of The Commune—the social standards and philosophical ideals that form the basis of community life—are complex, and often run counter to individual instinct; the earliest generations of The Commune, especially, will likely have lingering notions of egoism and individualism that education will have to overcome. These very capitalist carryovers are the justification for formal education: the passing down of values and principles that are too important to the community to leave their attainment up to chance.

To this end, formal schooling has a threefold mission. The first is to simplify the environment, to allow the young to assimilate into the community at a manageable rate. The second is to eliminate features of the environment that would be a negative influence upon the forming mentalities

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 309.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

of the youth. Those assigned to the care and education of the young would be those most capable of teaching the precepts of the commune, and limiting exposure to the harmful remnants of capitalist ideology that will likely still be present among the adult population (*cf.* the section “The Elderly,” below). It is important here to note that this is not indicative of indoctrination or pro-commune propaganda; the end to this sort of purification is simply social good. “As a society becomes more enlightened,” Dewey writes, “it realizes that it is responsible *not* to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements, but only such as make for a better future society.”⁹⁰ In the case of The Commune, this means not passing down the ideals of the capitalist society from which The Commune has evolved, but only the precepts thus laid out, which will serve to better the community. In fact, education is undoubtedly the most powerful tool for the type of societal reform desired by The Commune. “We may produce in schools,” writes Dewey, “a projection in type of the society we should like to realize, and by forming minds in accord with it gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant features of adult society.”⁹¹

3) The Elderly

The Commune recognizes that over the course of an individual’s life, he or she will be unable to contribute sufficiently to meet the specified quota via manual labor. Thus, it will be necessary—for their sustainability—to allocate them resources to which they have not directly contributed. In his dialogue on Enlightenment thought, Denis Diderot recognizes that these specific demographics pose a drain on resources.⁹²

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 316-7.

⁹² “OROU: Un enfant qui naît, occasionne la joie domestique et publique : c’est un accroissement de fortune pour la cabane, et de force pour la nation : ce sont des bras et des mains de plus dans Tahiti ; nous voyons en lui un agriculteur, un pêcheur, un chasseur ... un époux, un père. ...

L’AUMONIER: Mais des enfants sont longtemps à charge avant que de rendre service.

OROU: Nous destinons à leur entretien et à la subsistance des vieillards, une sixième partie de tous les fruits du pays ; ce tribut les suit partout. Ainsi tu vois que plus la famille du Tahitien est nombreuse, plus elle est riche.

L’AUMONIER: Une sixième partie!

OROU: C’est un moyen sûr d’encourager la population, et d’intéresser au respect de la

To ameliorate this conflict, elders will instead contribute by providing apprenticeships for children and young adolescents in one of their fields of specialization (for by now, elders will likely have been exposed to several areas of work). As Dewey writes, “A baby in the family is equal with others, not because of some antecedent and structural quality which is the same as that of others, but in so far as his needs for care and development are attended to without being sacrificed to the superior strength, possessions, and matured abilities of others.”⁹³ By forging a working relationship between the elders and children (who cannot immediately contribute), The Commune ensures its ability to continue raising skilled contributors in subsequent generations by investing a portion of its immediate resources in its non-contributing members.

Conclusion

The societal model described above for The Commune relies on basic precepts and ideologies that have not been fostered in the capitalist world, and therefore will likely take several generations of cultivation before it will function with ease. The competitive capitalist mindset has been deeply imprinted on all who have been born into and participate in it, and has the entirety of human history to support its claim to the triumph of inequality. Therefore, this Manifesto is necessarily changeable, and will likely be subject to change as flaws in the communal system are identified and rectified. However, this is a document that relies on the

vieillesse et à la conservation des enfants” (Denis Diderot, *Supplement au voyage de Bougainville: ou dialogue entre A et B sur l'inconvénient d'attcher des idées morales à certaines actions physiques qui n'en comportent pas* (1772), ch. III).

[“OROU: the birth of a child causes domestic and public joy: it is an increase in fortune for the home, and power for the nation: moreover, in Tahiti, they are the arms and hands; we see in one a farmer, one a fisherperson, a hunter ... a husband, a father. ...

THE CHAPLAIN: But the children are a burden for a long time before rendering service.

OROU: We intend for their maintenance and the subsistence by the elderly men, a sixth of all the fruits of the land; this tribute follows them everywhere. Thus you see that the larger the Tahitian family, the richer it is.

THE CHAPLAIN: A sixth?

OROU: It is a sure means to encourage the population, and in the interest to respect the elderly and the care of the children.” (Denis Diderot, *Addendum to the Journey of Bougainville: or, a dialogue between A and B on the drawback to binding moral ideas to certain physical actions which bear none* (1772), ch. III). —The Editors.]

⁹³ Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” *Op. Cit.*, 625.

scholarship of great thinkers, on the teachings of Marx, and on the intuition of its writers. It is a document with potential for success, an original prototype for a community the likes of which humankind has never seen before.

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JOHN LOCKE AND MODERN THEORIES OF MENTAL DISORDER

Lovro Savić is undergraduate philosophy and history student at Centre for Croatian Studies—University of Zagreb, Croatia. His primary areas of interest include philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy of mental disorder in general and (bio)ethics in psychiatry. He presented his work on several international philosophical and bioethical student conferences in Croatia. He hopes to pursue his postgraduate degree at “Philosophy and Ethics of Mental Health” Masters Programme at Warwick University, or “Philosophy of Mental Disorder” Masters Programme at King's College London.

GROUP RIGHTS IN THE LIBERAL STATE: THE LIMITATIONS OF IDEALISM AND THE NECESSITY OF PRACTICALITY

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ON PHYSICALISM, QUALIA AND AGENCY

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LOCKE AND THE GREAT INJUSTICE

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MANIFESTO FOR A PHILOSOPHICALLY JUSTIFIED COMMUNE

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UNTITLED ORIGINAL COVER ARTWORK

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